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In broad terms, a product seller's obligations to purchasers 
and product users are discharged by its introduction into 
commerce of a duly safe product.' If warnings or instructions for 
judicious use are necessary for the product to be used with no more 
than a reasonable degree of risk, then the failure to provide such 
2 
warnings or instructions renders the product defective. In a 
limited number of settings, however, a seller's warnings or 
instructions obligations will survive the product's initial sale.3 The 
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
1 .  RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TORTS: P R O D U ~  LIABlL1n § 1 cmt. a (1997) 
(defining "Liability of Commercial Sellers Based on Product Defect at Time of 
Sale"); see also id. at § 2 (setting forth the categories for when a product is defective 
at the time of sale). Other non-seller participants in the distribution of a product 
may be treated as sellers for the purposes of informational obligations. For the 
most part, these departures from the orthodox application of products liability to 
sellers alone occurs when the participant undertakes activities ordinarily associated 
with the activities of sellers. An example of such a non-seller that often is treated 
as a seller for the purposes of products liability might be a commercial automobile 
lessor. 
2. Id. at § 2(c). 
3. See generally AM. LAW PROD. LIAB. 3d fj 79 ("Post-Sale or Continuing Duty 
to Warn"). 
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presence or absence of a duty in tort, including a post-sale duty to 
provide warnings or instructions, is usually decided by the trial 
court as a matter of law.4 
The decisional law suggests that post-sale (often also described 
as "continuing") advisory duties may arise in four circumstances. In 
the first, a seller may be obligated to warn consumers of a latent 
defective and unreasonably dangerous condition associated with 
the product that was unknown at the time of initial sale, but which 
was discovered after sale."his is the position taken by the majority 
of courts that recognize such a duty in the first place.F An 
alternative tack is that taken by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability section 10, which states a rule that irrespective of 
whether there exists a latent point-of-sale defect, a post-sale 
advisory obligation may be imposed when "a reasonable person in 
the seller's position would provide such a warning."' 
A third position recognizes a post-sale warning obligation 
4. E.g., Wilson v. United States Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1998)(affirming summary judgment in elevator accident claim, finding 
manufacturer of elevator had no continuing duty to notify known p~~rchasers of 
technological advancements in door-closing mechanisms). See also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABlLIn § 10 cmt. a (1997): 
As with all rules that raise the question whether a duty exists, courts must 
make the threshold decisions that, in particular cases, triers of fact could 
reasonably find that product sellers can practically and effectively 
discharge such an obligation and that the risks of harm are sufficiently 
great tojustify what is typically a substantial post-sale undertaking. . . . In 
light of the serious potential for overburdening sellers in this regard, the 
court should carefully examine the circumstances for and against 
imposing a duty to provide a postsale warning in a particular case. 
5. Canto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Mass. 1975) (imposing post- 
sale duty to warn of latent design defect "to eliminate the risk created by the 
manufacturer's initial fault"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY 3 10 cmt. a (1997) (stating "[clourts recognize that warnings about risks 
discovered after sale are sometimes necessary to prevent significant harm to 
persons and property."); see generally Michael L. Matula, Manufacturer's Post-Sale 
Obligations in  tile 19901s, 32 TORT & INS. L.J., 87-88 (1996). E.g., Vasallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998). In Vmallo the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, "abrogating" prior precedent, wrote: "A manufacturer will 
be held to the standard of knowledge of an expert in the appropriate field, and 
will remain subject to a continuing duty to warn, a t  least purchasers, of risks 
discovered following the sale of the product at issue." Id. at 923. 
6. Znfra Part 11. 
7. RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 10(a) (1997). Id. 
at § 10 cmt. a ("Judicial recognition of the seller's duty to warn of a product- 
related risk after the time of sale, whether or  not the product is defective at the 
time of original sale within the meaning of other Sections of this Restatement, is 
relatively new."). 
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when a seller learns or should have learned of significant hazards 
associated with product misuse or alteration. Be the misuse or 
modification of the product caused by the user or by third parties, 
if it renders the foreseeable use of the product unreasonably 
unsafe, at least one influential court has held that the seller may be 
required to advise purchasers even in circumstances where the 
misuse or alteration might provide the seller a successful defense in 
a design defect claim.' 
The fourth approach, which a few courts have evaluated either 
independently or in conjunction with one or more of the positions 
stated above, focuses upon the relationship between the seller and 
the vendee, or as appropriate, users or consumers. Some courts 
adopting this approach propose that a post-sale duty will be 
appropriate only when, following the initial sale, the seller has 
commenced or continued activities, ranging from continued 
servicing of like products to undertaking safety-related research, 
sufficient to induce the purchaser or the user to reasonably expect 
the seller's duty to disseminate hazard information to continue. 
Along similar logic, some claimants have alleged that a post-sale 
failure to warn constitutes actionable negligence pursuant to the 
common law doctrine of "negligent undertaking."" 
In contrast to the substantial minority ofjurisdictions that have 
recognized one or another rationales for a continuing 
informational obligation, a far more restrictive approach prevails 
regarding claims that the seller should have recalled, retrofitted, or 
otherwise acted to remedy an unreasonable product hazard. When 
such a claim is posed by a plaintiff, it is often paired with an 
allegation that the seller also breached a continuing warning 
obligation. The profile of such claims fall into two broad categories. 
In the first category, plaintiff alleges that there exists a post-sale 
duty to recall or otherwise endeavor proactively to remedy a 
product flaw upon the seller's post-sale discovery of unreasonable 
risks not known to it at the time of initial sale. The second category 
of such claims arises when post-sale advancements in technology 
might permit or have permitted introduction and sale of an 
-- -- - 
8. See generally Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998). The 
plaintiff in Lin'uno, a teenaged grocery store employee, suffered amputation of his 
right hand and lower forearm while using defendant's commercial meat grinder, 
from which the safety guard had been removed. Id. at 305. 
9. See generally Artiglio v. Corning Inc., 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998)(claim 
brought by recipients of silicone breast implants). 
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alternatively-designed and safer product.'0 
Courts and legislatures have generally declined to impose such 
latter obligations, even in jurisdictions recognizing one or another 
form of continuing warning obligation. A frequently stated 
rationale for resisting calls for post-sale recall or repair duties has 
been the high costs associated with recalls and retrofitting. 
Accordingly, there is virtual unanimity that such a duty will 
ordinarily only be triggered in two limited circumstances. The first 
is when such action is required by statute, regulation or 
governmental order, and the seller has failed to execute such an 
11 
obligation. The second is when, even absent a governmentally 
imposed obligation, the seller has "undertak[en] to recall the 
product[,]" and has failed to perform this undertaking as would a 
12 
reasonable man. Products Liability Restatement section 11 
proposes recognition of these two limited exceptions, and none 
other, to a broader "no duty" rule for recall and similar asserted 
obligations. 
In a quite significant expansion of the law of seller warning 
and instructions duties, a growing number of jurisdictions now 
recognize one or another post-sale or continuing seller 
informational duties. As with warnings duties generally, when a 
post-sale warning obligation is imposed, the question of to whom 
the warning should be given will turn upon the facts of a particular 
case, and will contemplate evaluation of the risks involved, the 
efficacy and feasibility of one warning strategy over another, and 
the likelihood that any warning will be conveyed to the users of the 
product or those vulnerable to injury or loss due to the product's 
IS 
unsafe condition. State by state authority as to the 
10. See generally RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11 
(1997) ("Liability of Commercial Product Seller or  Distributor for Harm Caused 
by Post-Sale Failure to Recall Product"); see also id. at § ll(Reportst Note (a)) 
(collecting authority). 
11. Id. at § 11 (a) (1) (1997) (proposing liability for harm when the seller fails 
to recall a product if "a governmental directive issued pursuant to a statute or 
administrative regulation specifically requires the seller or distributor to recall the 
product"). 
12. Z d . a t § 1 1 ( 2 ) ( a ) ( l ) , ( 2 ) .  
13. Seegenerally Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 459 (Pa. 1992) (stating 
"[tlhe responsibility to warn of known defects cannot be satisfied merely by 
alerting participating service centers. Because of the likelihood that a purchaser 
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appropriateness of such duties remains split, with a substantial 
number of jurisdictions finding or predicting that no such general 
obligation should be imposed absent a showing of a point-of-sale 
defect.I4 Still other jurisdictions have reached no decisions on the 
matter. 
Evaluation of the efficacy or adequacy of any post-sale warning 
is similar, but not identical to that pertaining to point-of-sale 
warnings. As with point-of-sale warnings, the seller's duty is owed 
generally to foreseeable product users or to intermediaries who can 
15 
reasonably be expected to pass on the warning. However, a quite 
particularized and polycentric evaluation may ensue in weighing 
the need for and the anticipated efficacy of a post sale warning. 
Read in the aggregate, the decisional law suggests that this 
evaluation of nature of the warning and to whom it should be given 
are guided properly by evaluation of the harm that may follow from 
use of the product without an advisory from the seller; the 
reliability of any intermediary who may be enlisted to convey the 
warnings to the current user; the burden on the vendor or 
manufacturer in locating the persons to be warned; the attention 
that a notice of the type contemplated would likely receive from 
the recipient; the nature of the product involved; and the 
corrective actions, if any, taken by the seller in addition to the 
16 post-sale warning. 
will have a product serviced by its own technicians or by an ~ n ~ l i a t e d  service 
center ... sellers must take reasonable steps to warn the user or consumer 
directly."); see also Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864,872 (N.Y. 1984) (commenting 
that the "nature of the warning to be given and to whom it should be given 
likewise turn upon a number of factors, including the harm which may 
result. . . ."). 
14. RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10 (Reporters' 
Note (a)) (citing, among other decisions, Birchler v. Gehl Co., 88 F.3d 518 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (Illinois law imposes no general continuing duty to warn)); Romero v. 
Int'l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Colorado law); 
Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 589 N.E.2d 569, 579 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991); Syrie v. 
Knoll Int'l, 748 F.2d 304, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas law). Even 
without applicable Nebraska state court decisions, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Anderson v. Nissan Motors Co., 139 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 1998) predicted 
that no such general post-sale warning duty would be imposed under Nebraska 
law. Id. at 602. In that action, involving injuries to a forklift operator, the plaintiff 
claimed that the manufacturer owed a post-sale duty to warn of dangers of 
operating the forklift without an operator restraint system. Id.. 
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 388 cmt. n (1965) (stating a method 
of warning should give "reasonable assurance that the information will reach those 
whose safety depends upon their having it"). 
16. Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 131415 (Kan. 
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Distinct issues are raised by claims that a successor corporation 
breached a duty to warn of product defects that it discovers, after 
17 
sale, in its predecessor's product. In Harris v. T.I., Inc., the 
Virginia Supreme Court, "assuming without deciding that in the 
proper case [the court] would recognize a successor corporation's 
post-sale duty to warn[,]" found nevertheless that the plaintiff had 
not proved a "special relationship" between the consumer and the 
successor that would support finding such a duty." The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability states a rule 
proposing successor liability for failure to provide post-sale 
warnings when: 
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide services 
for maintenance or repair of the product or enters into a 
similar relationship with the purchasers of the 
predecessor's product giving rise to actual or potential 
economic advantage to the successor, and (2) a 
reasonable person in the position of the successor would 
19 provide a warning. 
Many states have by statute adopted statutes of repose that 
operate to extinguish any potential products liability claim upon 
passage of a certain number of years following a product's initial 
sale, without regard to whether or not a product has caused an 
injurious accident or illness by that time. Among the cluster of 
rationales for such legislation is that a statute of repose can give 
1993). The Patton court noted, however, that ordinarily the manufacturer has no 
duty to take the additional measure(s) of retrofitting or recalling the product. Id. 
at 1315. See also discussion infra Part 111. 
17. 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992). 
18. Id. at 610, explained in Ambrose v. Southworth Products, Inc., 953 F. 
Supp. 728, 733 (W.D. Va. 1997) (claim against successor of industrial elevator 
manufacturer). 
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCXS LIABILI~Y § 13(a) ( I ) ,  (2) 
(1997). The Products Liability Restatement Section 13(b) provides indicia for 
determining whether "[a] reasonable person in the position of the successor 
would provide a warning[,]" and states: 
(b) A reasonable person in the position of the successor would provide a 
warning if: 
(1) the successor knows or reasonably should know that the product 
poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and 
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and 
can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and 
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those 
to whom a warning might be provided; and 
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing 
a warning. 
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finality to a seller's potential liability, with the advantages for 
business planning and efficient procurement of insurance that 
such finality brings. It would, therefore, seem to follow that upon 
exhaustion of an applicable state repose period, a seller's potential 
liability for any post-sale warning or other product-related 
obligation would likewise cease. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
decided otherwise in Sharp v. Case ~ o r p . ~ ~  Sharp involved a suit 
brought by a minor, an Oregon resident, and his parents against 
the tractor manufacturer, alleging that a defect in the tractor's 
power take-off (PYO) shaft caused it to engage without warning, 
causing the seventeen year-old farm worker's arms to be drawn into 
the baling mechanism, and amputating both beneath the elbow." 
While ultimately deciding that the juxtaposition or Oregon law and 
Wisconsin law on the issue presented only a false conflict, the 
Wisconsin court adopted as authoritative the Oregon Supreme 
Court's interpretation of its statute of repose as germane only to a 
seller's acts or omissions to acts occurring before sale, and as not 
"intend [ed] . . .to immunize defendants for claims based upon 
negligent acts or omissions committed after the sale of a product."22 
It is necessary to note that the general post-sale warning 
propositions regarding seller inquiry and advisory duties have little 
applicability to the specialized duties of sellers of prescription 
products.23 By statute and by decisional law, the seller of 
prescription products has always been held to have a continuing 
duty to advise governmental authorities of new information 
regarding risk levels in use of his products, and to employ on an 
ongoing basis their scientific and medical expertise to discover and 
20. 595 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1999). 
21. Id. at 383. 
22. Id. at 385. The Sharp court continued by quoting the Oregon Supreme 
Court's decision in Erickson Air-Crane v. United Tech. Corp., 735 P.2d 614, 618 
(Or. 1987), to this effect: 
[The legislature], in enacting [Oregon Statute] 30.905, contemplated 
placing limits only on a defendant's exposure to liability for acts or 
bmissions taking place before or at the time the defendant places the 
product in the stream of commerce. Nothing in [Oregon Statute] 30.905 
or its legislative history indicates that the legislative intent was to allow a 
manufacturer to retreat to the date of "first purchase for use or 
consumption" and raise the defense of [Oregon Statute] 30-905 for 
negligent acts committed after the date of the first purchase[.] 
23. "[Clourts traditionally impose a continuing duty of reasonable care to test 
and monitor after sale to discover product-related risks" of prescription drugs and 
devices. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 10 
cmt. c (1997). 
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advise health care professionals of new hazard related information. 
Thus, with regard to manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, most 
jurisdictions recognize a "continuous duty" to remain apprised of 
new scientific and medical developments and to inform the 
medical profession of pertinent information related to treatment 
and side effects.24 This continuing informational obligation 
imposed upon the manufacturer even after the marketing of the 
product is not confined to the passive interpretation of scientific, 
medical, or technical advances or revelations explored by third 
parties. Under certain circumstances, the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer's continuing post-sale duties have been found to 
include the initiation of further investigations, studies or tests.2i 
Because the law of most states has essentially fused the concept 
of strict liability failure to warn with that of negligent failure to 
warn, some states recognizing post-sale advisory duties make no 
distinction between claims brought in negligence and those 
brought in strict tort liability. Decisions in other jurisdictions have 
concluded, however, that important distinctions remain between 
24. Id. ("With regard to ...p rescription drugs, courts traditionally impose a 
continuing duty to test and monitor after sale to discover product-related risks."). 
E.g., Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1049-50 (Kan. 
1984). In cases involving prescription drugs the courts have imposed a 
"continuous duty to keep abreast of scientific developments touching upon the 
manufacturer's product and to notify the medical profession of any additional side 
effects discovered from its use ...." The drug manufacturer's duty to warn is, 
therefore, commensurate not only with its actual knowledge gained from research 
and adverse reaction reports, but also with its constructive knowledge as measured 
by the scientific literature and other available means of communication. 
Id. (quoting Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919,922 (8th Cir. 1970)). 
Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the continuing investigational 
duty described in Wooahson "should be narrowly applied to the facts peculiar to 
the manufacture and distribution of ethical drugs." Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich 
Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1308 (Kan. 1993); see also Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 
S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tenn. 1994) ("Manufacturers of prescription drugs, like 
manufacturers of any other unavoidably dangerous product, have a duty to market 
and distribute their products in a way that minimizes the risk or danger."); 
Stanback v. Parke Davis & Co., 502 F. Supp. 767,769-70 (W.D.Va. 1980) (involving 
suit brought by a patient who, after receiving flu vaccine, contracted Guillane- 
Barre Syndrome). In Stanback, the court stated, at id.: 
Although the duty of the ethical drug manufacturer to warn is limited to 
those dangers which the manufacturer knows or should know are 
inherent in the use of the drug, the manufacturer is treated as an expert 
in its particular field and is under a continuing duty to notify the medical 
profession of any side effects subsequently discovered from its use. 
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: P R O D U ~ S  LlABlLIn 5 10 cmt. c (1997); 
supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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negligence and strict liability claims, and that those distinctions 
commend recognition of a continuing duty in negligence, but not 
in strict tort liability. As the Kansas Supreme Court explained in 
26 Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufacturing Co., " [a] negligence 
analysis is more appropriate than an application of strict liability in 
the post-sale context" because "the emphasis in strict liability upon 
the danger of the product rather than the conduct of the 
manufacturer" requires recognition that if "a product is not .  . . 
unreasonably dangerous by the absence of warnings when it leaves 
the manufacturer's control, it cannot at some later date become 
unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of warnings."27 
Whether a continuous seller advisory duty is recognized in 
strict liability, in negligence or in both doctrines, the state by state 
formulations-usually judicial-of the duty, explicitly or implicitly, 
fall into four broad categories. In the first category, a seller may 
have a duty to advise purchasers of latent product defects of which 
the seller learns subsequent to initial sale. In the second category, 
which is that adopted by Products Liability Restatement section 10, 
a seller may have such a continuing duty without regard to whether 
the product was defective at the time of sale, if a reasonable seller 
would recognize a substantial product risk and take measures to 
warn of it. A third position is that even should the post-sale 
product risk be occasioned by product modification or misuse, 
where such misuse or modification becomes known to the seller a 
duty to warn of the risks may attach even if the misuse or alteration 
would serve as a defense to a design defect claim. A fourth and 
final basis for a continuing duty provides for recognition of a duty 
that is triggered when a seller has sustained a level of contact with 
the buyer or the user, or has undertaken initial remedial, 
ameliorative or informational responsibilities, and the purchaser or 
third parties have placed reliance upon its continuation. Each of 
these four approaches will be discussed in order. 
Latent Defect Not Discovered Until After Initial Sale. Both by 
statutez8 and by decisional law a "growing number" of jurisdictions 
26. 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993). 
27. Id. at 1310. 
28. The pertinent provision of the Iowa Code states: 
Nothing contained in this section shall diminish the duty of an 
assembler, designer, supplier of specifications, distributor, manufacturer 
or seller to warn of subsequently acquired knowledge of a defect or 
dangerous condition that would render the product unreasonably 
dangerous for its foreseeable use or diminish the liability for failure tb 
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have expanded a seller's point-of-sale warning responsibilities "to 
require warnings after the sale when the product later reveals a 
defect not known at the time of sale."" As the following discussion 
will demonstrate, where not required by statute, imposition of a 
post-sale obligation will most frequently turn on consideration of 
the nature and degree of the potential harm, and the feasibility of 
undertaking such post-sale  effort^.'^ 
While many states have yet to rule on the issue, a sturdy 
minority have concluded that "[wlhen a manufacturer learns . . . of 
the dangers associated with a reasonably foreseeable use of its 
products after they are distributed . . . [it] must take reasonable 
steps to warn reasonably foreseeable users about those dangers.. . ,131 
Under this emerging body of law of post-sale duties, a 
manufacturer who, after the initial sale of the product, learns or 
should have learned of latent product defects that render the 
product not duly safe for foreseeable uses and who fails to warn the 
purchaser or the consumer when a reasonable seller would have 
done so may be liable for ersonal injury or property damage B proximately caused thereby.' As suggested, this scenario typically 
warn. 
IOM~A CODE 5 668.12 (1999). 
29. Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Iowa 1999) (noting Iowa 
adoption of doctrine by statute). 
30. Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 409 (N.D. 
1994) (allegedly defective tire and wheel); Patton v. Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d at 
131415 (allegedly defective farm equipment, with court writing that factors to 
consider in deciding presence or absence of duty include nature and likelihood of 
the injury, feasibility, expense, effectiveness of potential warning, and ability to 
identify past purchasers); Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 866 (N.Y. 1984) 
(alleged malfunction of acceleration system & brake failure). 
31. Moulton v. Rival Co., 116 F.3d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1997) (Maine law). 
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILIn RESTATEMENT § 10 
cmt. b (1997) ("The standard governing the liability of the seller is objective: 
whether a reasonable person in the seller's position would provide a warning."). 
While Products Liability Restatement § 10 speaks in terms of sellers, cmt. b thereto 
recognizes that manufacturers and non-manufacturing sellers are not similarly 
situated: 
In applying the reasonableness standard to members of the chain of 
distribution it is possible that one party's conduct may be reasonable and 
another's unreasonable. For example, a manufacturer may discover 
information under circumstances satisfying [§IO(b)(l)-(4)] and thus be 
required to provide a post-sale warning. In contrast, a retailer is 
generally not in a position to know about the risk discovered by the 
manufacturer after sale and thus is not subject to liability because it 
neither knows nor should know of the risk. Once the retailer is made 
aware of the risk, however, whether the retailer is subject to liability for 
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involves (1) a product that is defective at the time of sale; (2) the 
defect, due to its latent nature, is undetected prior to sale; and (3) 
the defect becomes known or knowable-by consumer complaints, 
related accidents or otherwise-only after the original sale." 
An early and influential decision identifying a manufacturer's 
post-sale duty to warn was entered in Comstock v. General Motors 
34 Corp., which involved the alleged failure of the automobile 
manufacturer to take remedial measures after learning, soon after 
the model was put on the market, of a vulnerability of the vehicles' 
brakes to failure. A personal injury claim was brought by a 
mechanic at an automobile dealership who suffered severe injuries 
when a car rolled unimpeded into him in a service bay. The court, 
after first describing the manufacturer's general duty to warn at the 
point of sale, stated that "a like duty to give prompt warning exists 
when a latent defect which makes the product hazardous becomes 
known to the manufacturer shortly after the product has been put 
on the market."" 
The Kansas Supreme Court took a harmonious approach in 
36 Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Manufactum'ng Co., and while 
highlighting the importance of the gravity of the harm, stated: "We 
recognize a manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn ultimate 
consumers ... when a defect, which originated at the time the 
product was manufactured, is discovered to present a life- 
threatenin hazard."37 To like effect is Korlowski v. John E. Smith 
3 8 Sons Co., in which plaintiff alleged defective design and 
inadequate warnings at the time of sale.39 
failing to issue a post-sale warning depends on whether a reasonable 
person in the retailer's position would warn under the criteria set forth in 
[slo(b) (1)-(4)1. 
33. Id. at 5 10 cmt. c (noting that a post-sale duty to warn may arise "when 
new information is brought to the attention of the seller, after the time of sale, 
concerning risks accompanying the product's use or  consumption."). 
34. 99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959). 
35. Id. at 632; see also Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 521 N.W.2d 401, 
407 (N.D. 1994) ("[ilnterpreting our products liability law to allow manufacturers 
to ignore post-sale knowledge about dangers associated with products i s . .  . 
contrary to prevailing principles of negligence law"). 
36. 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993). 
37. Id. at 1313. 
38. 275 N.W.2d 915 (Wis. 1979). 
39. Accord Gracyalny v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 723 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 
1983) (claim that manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings regarding 
post point-of-sale discovery of hidden defect); Gregory v. Cincinnat Inc., 538 
N.W.2d 325, 328 (Mich. 1995) ("[Blefore there can be a true continuing duty- 
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After-Discovered Product Risk Irrespective of Point of Sale Defect. A 
post-sale duty to warn may attach when the product, through use or 
operation, has betrayed hazards not earlier known to the seller, or 
to other sellers of like products.40 Products Liability Restatement 
section 10 adopts a conventional "reasonable seller" approach to 
gauging whether such a duty exists on any particular set of facts.41 
The section states that such a duty to provide post-sale warnings is 
triggered "when a reasonable person in the seller's position would 
provide such a warning."4' In assessing the reasonableness 
standard, subsection (b) thereto suggests considering a number of 
factors such as whether: 
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the 
product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons or 
property; and (2) those to whom a warning might be 
provided can be identified and may reasonably be 
assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and (3) a 
warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on 
by those to whom the warning might be provided; and (4) 
the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden 
of providing a warning.43 
On reasoning that can be reconciled with the Products 
Liability Restatement emphasis upon hazard recognition and 
warning feasibility, a New Jersey appeals court in Dixon v. Jacobsen 
Mfg. C C J . ~ ~  stated: "Where the manufacturer knew the identity of the 
whether it be to warn, repair or recall-there must be a defect or actionable 
problem at the point of manufacture."); see also Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc., 528 
N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (held: manufacturer had no post-sale duty 
when products were produced without defects; manufacturer not required to 
provide notice of updated features). 
40. Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp 728, 748 (D.N.J. 1995) (held: 
manufacturer of garbage truck lacking safety decals warning of dangers posed by 
using riding step while truck operating in reverse, a manufacturer had duty to 
warn of dangers revealed by developing state of the art); see also Koker v. 
Armstrong Cork, Inc., 804 P.2d 659, 666 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (in 
shipyardworker's products liability action brought against manufacturers of 
asbestos products manufacturers, held: "[the] duty to warn attaches, not when 
scientific certainty of harm is established, but whenever a reasonable person using 
the product would want to be informed of the risk of harm in order to decide 
whether to expose himself to it."); see generally Robert E .  Manchester, Consequences 
of Failure to Recall Defctive Product at Earliest Possible Moment, 1 PROD.LIAB.L.J. 76 
(1988); Matula, supra note 5 at 3. 
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILIn § 10 (a) (1997). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at  § 10(b) (1)-(4). 
44. 637 A.2d 915,92324 (N.J. App. Div. 1994). 
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owner of its product, we have no hesitation in holding that such 
[post-sale] duty existed, and it was for the jury to determine 
whether that duty had been discharged."45 The Products Liability 
Restatement "reasonable seller" position can be recognized as 
providing for a duty that may be broader than that advanced in 
Comstock and the cases following Comstock's approach, which is to 
say, adoption of a requirement that plaintiff show that the product 
had a point-of-sale (and presumably latent) defect. Products 
Liability Restatement section 10 contains no such requirement. 
Thus a warning duty may, of course, be found when a pre-existing 
defect is or should have been discovered, but also when, 
irrespective of defect, the hazard and the circumstances set forth in 
section 10(b) (1)-(4) are such that a reasonable seller would 
provide a post-sale warning. 
The majority of jurisdictions have held that the manufacturer 
of a nondefective product has no duty to warn prior purchasers of 
new safety devices that are employed by the manufacturer or by 
manufacturers of like product. In the words of one federal trial 
court applying Pennsylvania law: "there is no cause of action for a 
continuing duty to warn purchasers of new developments which 
may make the product more safe."46 Products Liability Restatement 
section 10 makes clear its recognition that even if the product had 
no latent defect at the time of initial sale, many products, while 
nondefective and reasonably or duly safe at the time of sale, later 
become recognized to pose avoidable (though not necessarily 
unreasonable) risks of injury because later post-manufacture 
advancements in science or technology permit an alternative and 
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS L I A B I L ~  § 10 cmt. a (1997), 
Reporters' Note. 
46. Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 797 F. Supp. 381, 386 (M.D. Pa. 1992); see 
also Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal 
denied, 549 N.W.2d 563 (1996); Romero v. Int'l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 
1446 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Colorado law)(held: duty to provide prior 
purchasers with advisories only appropriate upon proof that the product was 
defective under standards existing at the time of manufacture) (collecting 
authority); Moorehead v. Clark Equip. Co., No. 86 C 1442,.1987 WL 26158, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (applying Illinois law) (court rejects plaintiffs argument that there 
existed a "continuing duty of a manufacturer to notify prior purchasers of new 
safety devices"); see generally Comment, Gregoly TI. Cincinnati Incorporated: Searching 
for Continuing Duty to Recall or Retrofit Products Under Michigan Law, 1996 DET. C.L. 
MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 721 (1996). E.g., Williams v. Monarch Machine Tool Co., 26 
F.3d 228, 223 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Maine law) (held: no manufacturer duty 
"to advise purchasers about post-sale safety improvements that have been made to 
a machine that was reasonably safe at the time of sale."). 
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safer design. Still and all, section 10 should be interpreted as 
suggesting that when a product is duly safe at the point of sale, 
based upon then extant scientific, medical or technological 
knowledge, even upon a plaintiffs showing that advancements in 
knowledge would permit the product to be made more safely, 
courts ought not make manufacturers responsible for advising 
purchasers or consumers of the virtues of the safer product unless 
"a reasonable person in the seller's position" would do so.47 
The decisional law supports this position, and one finds ample 
authority that a reasonable seller is not obligated to advise 
purchasers or others regarding advancements in safety. This is 
particularly so in settings in which the product, at the time of initial 
sale, was not conspicuously obsolete and conformed to established 
industry  standard^.^' One rationale underlying the refusal of courts 
to impose a general duty to advise past purchasers of technological 
or safety advances is that an obligation upon manufacturers to 
identify, locate and warn all users of safety improvements would 
unreasonably burden a man~facturer.~' As most technologically 
advanced products are regularly improved upon in terms of either 
their effectiveness or their safety, one official comment to section 
10 states plainly that it does not propose a post-sale warning duty 
every time a subsequent design modification results in improved 
safety.50 In this respect the official comments to Products Liability 
Restatement section 10 adopt the prevailing rule that post-sale 
warning duties do not extend to advisory notification of post-sale 
safety improvements.51 Products Liability Restatement section 10 ' 
47. RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILI~ § 10 (a) (1997). 
48. Wilson v. United States Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235, 237, 241 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1998) (no duty to provide post-sale advisories of improvements in elevator 
door closing mechanism). 
49. RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TORTS: P R O D U ~ S  LIABlLIn § 10(a) cmt. c 
(1997) ("When risks are not actually brought to the attention of sellers, the cost of 
constantly monitoring product performance in the field is usually too burdensome 
to support a post-sale duty to warn."); see also Williams v. Monarch Machine Tool 
Co., 26 F.3d 228, 232 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying Massachusetts law) (holding latent 
defects must exist before any post-sale duty arises); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich 
Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1311 (Kan. 1993) (declining to "impose a requirement 
that a manufacturer seek out past customers and notify them of changes in the 
state of the art."). 
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10 cmt a. (1997). 
51. Accord Wilson v. United States Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1998). In Wilson, which involved a plaintiffs injury when his hand was caught in 
the doors of an elevator, plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer had a duty to 
advise the elevator purchaser (the premises manager) of a "shield sensor" 
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comments caution, however, that such a post-sale inquiry and 
potential warning obligation may exist "when reasonable grounds 
exist for the seller to suspect that a hitherto unknown risk exists, 
especially when the risk involved is great [.I "52 
Products Liability Restatement subsections 10 (b) (2) & (3) 
suggest that the assessment of the presence or absence of duty take 
into account that there will be varying degrees of feasibility in 
identifying purchasers or current users. A motor vehicle, a piece of 
capital equipment, or a durable and relatively expensive product 
such as a meat slicer used in a sandwich shop, will often be 
traceable through the location of product identification numbers, 
returned warranty cards, dealer records, or other fairly accessible 
means. For such products, where the other criteria of section 
10(b) are met, application of the liability rule that section imposes 
will be appropriate. For other classes of products, price, 
perishability, limited useful life, or the availability of such products 
through typical over-the-counter markets which characteristically 
do not involve recording the purchasers' name, will militate against 
finding a post-sale duty to warn individual product users or 
consumers. Products Liability Restatement section 10 comment (e) 
observes that when customer records are not available, it becomes 
more difficult for sellers to iden* its product users for whom 
warnin s would be useful and may prevent a post-sale duty from 
5 3  
arising. In some circumstances, nonetheless, the absence of 
means for individual consumer identification will not obviate the 
appropriateness of a post-sale warning duty, such as, for example, if 
"customer records ... identify the population to whom warnings 
should be provided.. . [or] indicate classes of product users, or 
geographically limited markets[,]" thereby permitting post-sale 
warnings by public notice.54 
Products Liability Restatement section 10(b)(4), which 
emphasizes the centrality of considering the severity of the 
potential injury in assessing continuing seller duties, is in 
available after the manufacture and sale of the elevator in question. Id. at 237-38. 
Held: "the fact that other safety methods were available imposed no duty on the 
manufacturer to 'produce a machine which incorporated only the ultimate in 
safety features."' Id. at 238 (quoting Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. 454, P.2d 
1315 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). 
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: P R O D U ~ S  LIABILITY at 5 10 cmt. c. 
(1997). 
53. Id. at 5 10 (b) (3) cmt. e. 
54. Id. 
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agreement with the decisional law holding that where the severity 
of the potential injury is modest (as opposed to substantial, or 
serious), a continuing duty to provide warnings should not be 
imposed. While adopting in general terms a post-sale duty 
identified by the Products Liability Restatement, courts in some 
jurisdictions place particular emphasis upon the magnitude of 
danger factor. For example, in Crowston v. Goodyear Tire €3 ~ u b b e r , ~ ~  
the plaintiff, a service station employee, was injured while inflating 
a 16 inch truck tire on a mismatched 16.5 inch He sued 
Goodyear, the tire manufacturer, and Kelsey-Hayes Co., the wheel 
manufacturer, arguing that they had a post-sale duty to warn 
consumers and users about dangers of mi~rnatchin~.~' The North 
Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that the law of that state 
recognized post-sale advisory duties in "special"  circumstance^.^^ On 
the facts before it, the state high court held that the peril of tire 
rim and wheel mismatching was saciently great in terms of 
seriousness of injury and the large number of persons who might 
be exposed to the risk as to warrant im osition of a post-sale k' informational duty upon the man~facturer.~ 
Applying Minnesota law, a federal district court in McDaniel v. 
Bieffe USA, ~nc.~'  found that the manufacturer of a motorcycle 
helmet had a post-sale duty to warn of the risks of misusing the 
helmet's Velcro strap by employing it as a substitute for proper 
fastening of the helmet's actual chin strap.61 The claim arose 
following a fatal accident in which a motorcyclist's helmet 
dislod ed in an accident in which he was hit by a van that ran a red B light.6 The specific risk pertaining to the Velcro strip on the 
helmet's chin strap was that the strip was a feature intended only 
"to give the rider a means of fastening down the loose end of the 
strap after it [had] been passed through the retaining bar.'@ 
Decedent's representatives claimed that from a human factors 
standpoint, the design was defective, in that it "induce [dl.. .users 
521 N.W.2d 401,405 (N.D. 1994). 
Id. at 405. 
Id. at 405-06. 
Id. at 409. 
Id. 
35 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D. Minn. 1999). 
Id. at 736, 743. 
Id. at 737. 
Id. at 736. 
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to fasten the strap" improperly,"64 which is to say, users might 
employ the Velcro surface to actually fasten the helmet, and forego 
passing the strap through the retaining bar. 
The federal trial court noted that the Minnesota Supreme 
- 
Court had explicitly recognized a post-sale duty to warn in "special 
cases."" The "special cases" language derived from the state high 
66 
court decision in Hodder v. Goodyear Tire €9 Rubber Co., also a tire 
rim personal injury case, in which the Minnesota high court 
emphasized the following findings: (1) the manufacturer had 
known for years that the rims "could be temperamental"; (2) "that 
the margin for error in servicing [the rims] was dangerously small;" 
(3) that when accidents occurred they usually resulted in death or 
serious bodily injury; and (4) that the defendant had plied the tire 
rim trade for many years, and even after ceasing production of the 
rim, had continued to sell tires and other products for use with the 
67 
rims. 
Since Hodder, the McDaniel court noted, observed, Minnesota 
courts and federal courts applying Minnesota law had found a post- 
sale duty to warn based upon the relative presence or absence of 
"Hodder factors."68 Finding that the McDaniel facts included some 
Hodder factors,6g and did not include others,70 and noting further 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 73940. 
66. 426 N.W.2d 826,823 (Minn. 1988). 
67. Id. at 833. 
68. McDaniel, 35 F. Supp.2d at 740: 
Relying opon Hodder, a few Minnesota courts, and federal courts applying 
Minnesota law, have recognized or discussed post-sale warning duties, e.g., T.H.S. 
Northstar Assocs. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 66 F.3d 173, 177 (8th Cir. 1995) (&rming 
district court decision to allow .jury determination of whether asbestos 
manufacturer breached its post-sale duty to warn); Ramstad v. Lear Siegler 
Diversified Holdings Corp., 836 F. Supp. 1511, 1517 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding 
auger manufacturer had no post-sale duty to warn of dangers associated with auger 
because numerous Hodderfactors not present); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 
F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (D. Minn. 1989) (recognizing post-sale duty to warn, and 
corresponding duty to test for alleged dangers associated with intrauterine 
contraceptive device); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96,100-01 (Minn. 
1989) (holding a successor corporation has no post-sale duty to warn of product 
defects where successor never succeeded to any s e ~ c e  contracts, was not aware of 
claimed defects, and did not know of location of the product at time of plaintiffs 
injury). 
69. The court noted specifically issues of fact as to whether the manufacturer 
had reason to know of the risk, including (1) the latency of the risk; (2) the 
potential for death or serious bodily injury; and (3) the continued sale of similar 
products. McDaniel, 35 F. Supp. at 740. 
70. Bieffe had not continued to senice the product, had not remained in 
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the absence of an explanation in Hodder of "what factors are 
determinative in deciding when to impose a post-sale duty-to 
warn[,] "71 the McDaniel court denied defendant Bieffe's motion for 
summary judgment as to the post-sale duty to warn count, 
concluding that under Minnesota law, material issues of fact existed 
72 
as to the manufacturer's warning obligations. 
~rowston,~\eferenced above, placed reliance upon Hodder in 
reaching its holding that Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. had a duty 
to advise past purchasers of a post-point of sale discovery of the 
danger of mismatching a sixteen-inch tire with a sixteen-and-one- 
74 half inch rim. Deciding that the logic of Hodder was sufficiently 
broad to commend its application to mass market consumer 
-- 
products,'" the South Dakota Supreme Court found the facts before 
it were aligned significantly with those considered by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Hoddm 
In both cases, serious injury was a consequence of the dangers 
associated with the use of the product. The defendants became 
aware of those dangers after the manufacture and sale of the 
product, and those dangers may have been eliminated by 
appropriate post-sale warnings. The number of individuals 
exposed to the potential dangers in both cases was significant. 
Although the number of.. . [the products] produced militates 
against individualized notice to the original purchasers, that 
same factor suggests that manufacturers cannot totally ignore 
post-sale information which has the potential to prevent serious 
76 injury to so many people. 
A continuing duty to warn was found in Alexander v. Morning 
77 Pride Manufacturing, Inc., a suit brought by fire fighters against the 
manufacturer of fire fighting "bunker gear" that allegedly failed to 
protect plaintiffs adequately against burns when they knelt on hot 
18 
surfaces. The plaintiffs complained that the material in the knees 
- -- -- -- - - -- 
contact with users, and had not undertaken a duty to keep purchasers advised of 
product developments. Id. at 740-41. 
71. Id. at 741. 
72. Id. at 741-743. 
73. 521 N.W.2d 401,408-09 (N.D. 1994). 
74. Id. at 409. 
75. Id. at 408 ("Simply because a product is mass produced and widely 
distributed does not totally absolve a manufacturer of a post-sale duty to warn 
under ordinary negligence principles."). 
76. Id. at 409. 
77. 913 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
78. Id. at 364. 
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of the bunker gear, when compressed by the firefighters' kneeling, 
lost its heat-protective characteristics, and that in use, the 
defendant's protective gear bunker gear gave them no physical 
notice, such as by gradual warming, of the need to move their 
knees from the source of the heat. Rather, the complaint 
contended, the condition of the product created an unreasonable 
risk of serious burns before the fire fighters could take ordinary 
79 
measures to protect themselves. Denying the manufacturer's 
motion for summary judgment, the federal trial court wrote: 
As the Court instructed the jury, a manufacturer's duty to 
warn of inherent limitations in a product is a continuing 
one. Nevertheless, the testimony was clear that even after 
Morning Pride learned the 'horrendous' news that 
Philadelphia fire fighters were being burned, [it] never 
warned them, although it could easily have contacted 
[them] directly and warned them of the gear's 
 limitation^.^^ 
Post-Sale Duties Surviving Modzfication or Misuse of Product. 
Noteworthy as well are the situations in which the manufacturer 
has knowledge that its product is subject to systematic modification 
or misuse that elevates the risk of harm. When the manufacturer 
has actual or constructive knowledge that its product has been 
subject to widespread user modification, and there is information 
suggesting that such modifications create a risk of injury to persons 
or damage to property, the manufacturer's obligation to issue post 
point-of-sale advisories will depend upon the foreseeability of harm 
that may be occasioned by such modifications or alterations." 
79. Id. at  367. As explained by a 1991 revised sheet issued by defendant: 
"Wetness and compressio& both reduce system insulation. M'hen the system is 
BOTH wet and compressed, (i.e., the fire fighter kneeling after sweating in his 
liner; the increase in protection is even more pronounced (even worse the 
decrease is in the area of warning time). According to the evidence, no fire 
fighters received this user sheet, and the manufacturer withdrew it from use three 
years later." Id. at 368-69. 
80. Id. at 368. 
81. E.g., Piper v. Bear Med. Sys. Inc., 883 P.2d 407, 414 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) 
("[A] manufacturer may be liable for a failure to warn of dangers of product 
modifications that it knew or had reason to know were occurring."); Village of 
Groton v. Tokheim Corp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 565,568 (App.Div. 1994) (imposing upon 
manufacturer duty to warn authorized and unauthorized distributors after 
learning that product was being used with another product in a dangerous 
manner); see also Perry v. Rockwell Graphics Systems, Inc., Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) 
1 27,445 (D. Mass.1985) (not reported in F. Supp.). Perry involved a worker's 
injuries, sustained in 1982, while using a cardboard cutting machine 
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In many instances a post-sale product modification or the 
misuse of a product may be of a sufficient order of magnitude and 
so unforeseeable as to itself become the producing cause of the 
plaintiffs harm. One might first suppose that in such 
circumstances the manufacturer could not possibly be found liable 
for failing to provide warnings against a plaintiffs action that 
might, in ordinary circumstances, be shown to be a superceding 
cause of his harm, and a thus complete defense to any design 
defect claim that might be brought against the manufacturer. The 
issue then arises as to whether and in what circumstances a 
continuing warning duty might nevertheless be imposed even when 
product alteration or misuse would preclude a finding of defective 
design. 
A leading decision in this regard is that reached by the New 
York Court of Appeals in Liriano u. Hobart ~ o r p . ~ ~  Liriano involved a 
seventeen year-old grocery store employee who had his right hand 
and lower forearm amputated following an injury while using the 
store's meat grinder.s3 A safety device sold as original equipment 
with the product, and designed to prevent a user's hand from 
coming into contact with the grinder's feeding tube and "worm," 
had been removedB4. No warnings were on the machine indicatin 
the dangers of using the machine without the safety guard. i% 
Removal of the guard by persons unknown had taken r$ice during 
the time of its operation on the grocery store premises. 
The evidence showed that Hobart, the manufacturer, had 
learned "that a significant number of purchasers of its meat 
grinders had removed the safety guards[,] " and had commenced to 
affix warnings to new machines being sold, but had taken no effort 
to advise earlier purchasers of the risk." The Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals certified to the New York high court the question of 
whether or not "manufacturer liability exist under a failure to warn 
theory in cases in which the substantial modification defense would 
manufactured by defendant in 1914. Held: the manufacturer's "actual or 
imputed" knowledge of "widespread modification" of its presses in the cardboard 
industry "could be the basis for liability for failure to warn of hazards discovered 
after manufacture of the machine." Id. at 27,719. 
82. 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998). 
83. Id. at 305. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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,988 preclude liability under a design defect theory.. . . The New York 
Court of Appeals answered in the It commented that 
under New York law, a manufacturer has "a duty to warn of the 
danger of unintended uses of a product provided these uses are 
reasonably foreseeablevsg and explained: 
The justification for the post-sale duty to warn arises from 
the manufacturer's unique (and superior) position to 
follow use and adaptation of its product by consumers. 
Compared to purchasers and users of a product, a 
manufacturer is best placed to learn about the post-sale 
defects or dangers discovered in use. A manufacturer's 
superior position to garner information and its 
corresponding duty to warn is no less with respect to the 
ability to learn of modifications made to or misuse of a 
product.. . . This Court therefore concludes that 
manufacturer liability can exist under a failure to warn 
theory in cases in which a substantial modification 
defense.. .might otherwise preclude a design defect 
claim.90 
Post-Sale Duties Arising From Seller Conduct. Some decisions 
- 
falling within this final category seemingly recognize that upon 
particular facts, continuing advisory duties may arise when a seller 
has undertaken some level of cautionary effort upon which a 
product user has relied, thereby creating, plaintiff alleges, an 
obligation to continue to advise or warn on an ongoing basi~.~'  The 
fourth category of decisions that have evaluated post-sale warning 
or advisory duties have employed criteria similar in ways to those 
adopted in Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber ~0.''  and McDaniel v. 
93 Bieffe USA, Inc., discussed above. However in these cases, the 
courts have adopted the analysis of Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 3244, which states a rule that: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 
render services to another which he should recognize as 
-- 
88. Id. at 304. 
89. Id. at 305 (citations omitted). 
90. Id. at 307-08 (citations omitted). 
91. See generally Artiglio v. Coming Incorporated, 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998) 
(alleging defendant's toxicology research established such an "undertaking"); 
Walton v. Avco. Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 459 (Pa. 1992) (held: post-sale duty to warn 
where the manufacturer of a crucial component part of a helicopter was notified 
of product defect by subcontractor and had remained in contact with the owner). 
92. 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988). 
93. 35 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D. Minn. 1999) (applying Minnesota law). 
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necessary for the protection of the third person or his 
things, is subject to liability to the third person for 
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable care to [perform]94 his updertaking, if (a) his 
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of 
such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty 
owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is 
suffered because of reliance of the other or the third 
person upon the undertaking.g5 
Illustrative of such a "negligent undertaking" claim is that 
resolved by the California Supreme Court decision in Artzglio v. 
96 Corning, Inc., the review of an action brought by recipients of 
silicone gel breast implants against the manufacturer of the 
implants and its parent corporation. With specific regard to the 
claim against one of two parent corporations, Dow Chemical 
Company, plaintiffs asserted that (1) Dow had conducted 
toxicology research concerning various silicone products; (2) it had 
provided this research to the manufacturing subsidiary, Dow 
Corning Corp.; (3) the research "implicate[d] the well-being and 
protection of third parties [the implant recipients]"; and (4) the 
manufacturer's various undertakings with the research were 
conducted negligently." The trial court  ranted summary 
judgment, and the appellate court The California 
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, and in its holding 
emphasized two shortcomings of plaintiffs "negligent undertaking" 
count. First, the court found that once Dow had undertaken and 
shared its toxicological research, it did not incur thereby an 
obligation to conduct additional research and to advise either its 
subsidiary or the third party implant recipients indefinitely.gg In 
reaching this conclusion, the court quoted authority suggesting 
that "[tlhe duty of a 'good Samaritan' is limited. Once he has 
performed his voluntary act he is not required to continue to 
render aid indefinitely[,]" and that an initial act taken to protect 
another does not make the actor "the guarantor of [the third 
94. In the published Restatement provision, the bracketed word appears as  
"protect." Use of that word has been widely recognized as mistaken, and courts 
have instead substituted the word "provide." 
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). 
96. 957 P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998). 
97. Id. at 1319-20. 
98. Id. at 1316. 
99. Id. at 1319. 
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party's] future ~afety."'~' Secondly, the court wrote, the record 
revealed that other than the provision of early studies, Dow had 
engaged in no operational contact with Dow Corning, such as 
inspecting or testing the devices manufactured by its subsidiary that 
might form the basis for a relational argument for a post-sale duty, 
101 
or the basis for any claim of detrimental reliance. 
Whatever obstacles may stand in the way of a plaintiffs 
recovery under a "negligent undertaking" theory, there is broad 
authority for the proposition that the presence or absence of a 
post-sale warning obligation may turn upon the manufacturer's 
post-sale activities. Where a manufacturer has continued, for 
example, to promote a product as safe, a warning obligation may 
attach upon its learning of information indicating the contrary. 
102 For example, in T.H.S. Northstar & Assoc. v. WR. Grace & Co., a 
Minneapolis building owner sued for cleanup and abatement costs, 
alleging that Grace's Monokote 3  fireproofing product 
103 
contaminated the premises with asbestos. Subsequently, the 
federal appeals court affirmed an award of damages to plaintiff 
entered by a jury that had been instructed as to a limited 
104 
manufacturer continuing duty to warn. Grace argued that 
evidence adduced at trial fell short of a showing of "special 
I05 
circumstances" that would create an ex post warning obligation. 
The appeals court disagreed, finding that under applicable 
Minnesota law, such a "special circumstances" duty could be found 
to exist when "(1) the manufacturer insisted that its product was 
safe if used properly; (2) it became evident to the manufacturer 
over time that great care was required in the handling and 
servicing of the product, or serious injury would occur; and ( 3 )  the 
manufacturer continued in the business of selling related products 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1320 (citing Temporomandibular Joints (TMJ) Implants, 113 F.3d 
1184, 1194 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
102. 66 F.3d 173 (8th Cir. 1995). 
103. Id. at 174. 
104. The trial court's instruction read, id. at 176: 
[I]f a manufacturer learns that a previously distributed product poses a 
danger to users, it must give additional warnings or instructions that will 
enable users to make informed decisions and use the product safely. . . . 
A manufacturer has no duty to warn, however, if the user is or should be 
fully aware of the dangers hherent in a product, but past experience or 
familiarity with the product does not necessarily alert a user to all of the 
dangers associated with the product. 
105. Id. 
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and undertook a duty to warn users of post-sale hazards."Io6 
Along a similar line of reasoning is Calderon v. Machinenfabm'ek 
Bollegraff Appingedam BV.'~' C a b o n  was a suit brought by a paper 
baling machine operator against a service distributor whose agent 
made a post-sale service call, during which the service distributor's 
agent observed the hazardous condition created by the machine 
owner's removal of safety gates. An operator thereafter sustained 
severe injuries while reaching into the machine to untangle wires as 
the machine was still running, and suit was brought claiming that 
the service distributor had a duty to advise the operator or the 
operator's employer of the hazardous condition. The New Jersey 
court found that the trial court's removal of plaintiffs failure to 
warn count was error, as a jury might have found that the service 
distributor "had assumed an obligation to warn" the machine 
108 
owner. It found the error harmless, however, in light of 
persuasive evidence that any failure of the service distributor to 
provide post-sale cautionary information was the legal cause of 
plaintiffs harm, as the weight of the evidence supported the 
conclusion that any warning from defendant would not have been 
heeded by the plaintiffs employer.10g 
The "special relationship" or "special circumstances" rationale 
for evaluating a claimed warning duty was developed further in 
Birchler v. Gehl CO."' In that decision, the Seventh Circuit, applying 
Illinois law, considered appellant's assignment of error to the trial 
court's refusal to instruct the jury that a hay bailer manufacturer 
had a post-sale duty to warn of the risks created by the fact, 
appellant claimed, that the baler took in hay faster than an 
operator could release it. Affirming a defense verdict, the appeals 
court noted first that Illinois law does not recognize a general post- 
111 
sale duty to warn. The court distinguished Seegers G a i n  Co., Inc. 
112 
v. United States Steel Corp., which involved the explosion of a grain 
storage tank, which due to its steel construction, was unable to 
106. Id. (relying upon Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 
826 (Minn. 1988)). 
107. 667 A.2d I l l  1 (N.J. Super. 1995). 
108. Id. at 1115. 
109. Id. at 1116. 
110. 88 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1996). 
111. Id. at 52l(citing Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 589 N.E.2d 569, 579 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991)); Kempes v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., 548 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1989); Collins v. Hyster Co., 529 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
112. 577 N.E.2d 1364 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
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withstand the cold Illinois winter temperatures. Plaintiffs therein 
claimed that the seller knew of a prior accident that was virtually 
indistinguishable from the accident that caused their loss, and that 
their vendor knew specifically that the steel seller knew precisely 
the use to which the steel it sold would be put."J In contrast, the 
Birchler court continued, the appellant's claim before it involved 
"no personal relationship" between seller and buyer that would 
permit the seller to know how the product would be used, and 
sounded instead in the very language the Seegers court had used to 
distinguish its facts in such a way as to permit its departure from 
Illinois authority finding no post-sale warning obligation, i.e., 
settings in which courts declined to impose a continuing advisory 
duty in claims involving "an over-the-counter sale of a generic 
product for use by an unknown c~nsumer.""~ 
Plaintiffs often allege simultaneously that a manufacturer has 
breached both (1) a potential post-sale warning obligation; and 
(2) a potential recall or retrofit obligation. Courts and 
commentators, in turn, often discuss the bona fides of such claims 
as though are related closely, or even allied. However, the two 
claims are markedly different, and require separate analysis. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, in terms of the burden upon the 
manufacturer, the practical consequences of imposing a recall or 
retrofit obligation would typically be, and in several orders of 
magnitude, far greater than would be a requirement of even the 
most extensive continuing duty to warn. 
The far more costly and complex obligation to recall a product 
is readily distinguishable from, and more costly than, a post-sale 
duty to warn, as the would require the manufacturer to regain 
control over the entire product line, and to retrofit or upgrade it, 
incurring far higher internal and external costs than would be 
115 involved with a post-sale duty to warn. As, through technological 
113. Id. at 1374. 
114. Id. at 1373-74. 
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11 cmt. a ("Duties 
to recall products impose significant burdens on manufacturers. Many product 
lines are beriodically-redesigned so that they become safer over time. 1f every 
improvement in product safety were to trigger a common-law duty to recall, 
manufacturers would face incalculable costs every time they sought to make their 
product lines better and safer."). 
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advancements, products are continually being made safer and 
better, manufacturers would confront "incalculable costs" if the 
1 6  had to upgrade a product every time an improvement was made. 7 
Accordingly, the decisional law has adopted without deviation the 
rule that progress in technology that would permit, or have 
permitted, the design and manufacture of an improved and safer 
product will not trigger a seller duty to undertake a recall or other 
refitting efforts."' 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 11 
suggests a rule in which a seller incurs no recall duty unless such 
118 
action is required by statute or regulation, or the seller, having 
voluntarily commenced to recall a product, "fails to act as a 
reasonable person in recalling the product.""g Section 11 would 
impose a duty upon the seller to recall a defective product after the 
time of sale when a statute or other governmental regulation 
116. Id. 
11 7. RESTATEMENT ( HIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LmILIn 5 11 cmt. a, illus. 1 
states this hypothetical: 
MNO Corp. has manufactured and distributed washing machines for five 
years. MNO develops and improved model that includes a safety device 
that reduces the risk of harm to users. The washing machines sold 
previously conformed to the best technology available at the time of sale 
and were not defective when sold. M ~ O  is under no common-law 
obligation to recall previously-distributed machines in order to retrofit 
them with the new safety device. 
118. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability section 11 provides: 
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products 
is subject to liability for harm to persons or  property caused by a seller's 
failure to recall a product after the time of sale or distribution if: 
(a)(]) a governmental directive issued pursuant to a statute or 
administrative regulation specifically requires the seller or distributor to 
recall the product; o r  
(2) the seller or  distributor, in the absence of a recall requirement under 
Subsection (a) (1), undertakes to recall the product; and 
(b) the seller or  distributor fails to act as a reasonable man in recalling 
the product. 
Id. at § 11 cmt. a ("Issues relating to product recalls are best evaluated by 
governmental agencies capable of gathering adequate data regarding the 
ramifications of such undertakings."). Examples of decisions finding no common 
law recall or related duty are Anderson v. Nissan Motor Co., 139 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 
1998) (predicting Nebraska law in claim alleging manufacturer duty to equip 
previously sold forklift with operator restraint); Habecker v. Copperly Corp., 893 
F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[Nlo Pennsylvania case has recognized a duty to retrofit, 
and, indeed, one has suggested that such a duty would be inappropriate under 
established principles of Pennsylvania law.") (citing Lynch v. McStome & Lincoln 
Plaza Assoc., 548 A.2d 1276,1281 (Pa. Super. 1988)). 
119. RESTATEME~ (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11 (2) (b) (1997). 
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specifically requires a recall or when the seller voluntarily recalls 
the product and fails to act as would a reasonable person in 
recalling the 
The rationale for a rule that would impose liability only when 
the supplier is required specifically by statute or regulation to recall 
the product is based upon the recognition that the origination of 
any such duty would require a complex and polycentric evaluation 
of (1) breadth of risk; (2) severity of risk; (3) examination of 
alternative remedial measures; (4) financial and other costs to the 
manufacturer; and (5) the logistics, management and practicality 
of such an obligation. Such an evaluation, the logic continues, is 
best left to such government agencies as enjoy supervisory authority 
over the safety of like products, as they are (1) most practiced in 
the collection of risk and incident data; and (2) more expert than 
would be the manufacturer in assessing the benefits and the 
burdens of a recall; and (3) should a recall obligation be imposed, 
most able to work with the manufacturer to design and delimit the 
initiative in order to secure optimal results."' 
When a seller undertakes a voluntary recall, the Products 
Liability Restatement commends a rule for tort liability should the 
seller "fai[l] to act as a reasonable man in recalling the product."122 
Products Liability Restatement section 11 comment c explains that 
the reasoning for such an approach "lies partly in the general rule 
that one who undertakes a rescue, and thus induces other would- 
be-rescuers to forbear, must act reasonably in following 
Comment c notes tellingly that "courts appear to assume that 
voluntary recalls are typically undertaken in the anticipation that, if 
the seller does not recall voluntarily, it will be required to do so by 
a government regulat~r." '~~ Comment c concludes: "Having 
presumably forestalled the regulatory requirement, the seller 
should be under a common law duty to follow through in its 
commitment to re~all."'~' 
Informative in this connection, albeit in the context of an 
accident following a mandatory recall, in Spn'ngmeyer v. Ford Motor 
~ 0 . ' ' ~  a California appeals court considered the claim of a mechanic 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at § 11 cmt. a. 
122. Id. at § 11 cmt. c 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
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who was injured when a truck fan blade disengaged and struck 
him. The evidence suggested that the truck's prior owner, the 
lessor Avis, might not have responded to the manufacturer's timely 
recall initiatives. While stating the general proposition that a 
manufacturer's duty to produce a duly safe product is non- 
127 delegable, the California court reversed judgment for the 
mechanic, relying in part upon Ford's showing that its follow-up 
procedures for its recall showed due care, and included, among 
other efforts, an original recall notice to the prior owner, and two 
follow-up notices to the new owner, even absent a regulatory 
128 
obligation to do so. 
129 Similarly, in Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co., the claim of a 
dockworker whose legs were crushed by a straddle carrier used to 
move shipping containers, the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed 
plaintiffs damage award on his claim that the manufacturer had a 
duty to retrofit its product with safety devices unavailable at the 
130 time of initial sale. The court stated: "[Wle hold that a 
manufacturer has no duty to 'retrofit' its products with 'after- 
manufacture' safety equipment, although it may be found negligent 
or strictly liable for failing to install such equipment-or not 
otherwise making its product safer-existing at the time of 
rnan~facture."~~'  Likewise, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 
assessing Pennsylvania law, has noted that "no Pennsylvania case 
has recognized a duty to retrofit[.]"132 As the court explained: "A 
majority of jurisdictions hold that a duty to recall or retrofit will be 
127. Id. at 202. 
128. Id. at 20405 (noting that third-party negligence may constitute 
superseding cause when so extraordinary as to be unforeseeable). 
129. 944 P.2d 1279 (Haw. 1997). 
130. Id. at 1291. 
131. Id. 
132. Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1990); see also 
Lynch v. McStome & Lincoln Plaza Assoc., 548 A.2d 1276, 1281 (Pa. Super 1988). 
The Habeckercourt stated at id.: 
[Tlhe precise question presented for decision is this-in a negligence 
product liability case, where a manufacturer exercises reasonable care in 
producing a product which functions properly until the time of the 
accident and does not retain any post-sale responsibility for or control 
over its product, but where it is proven that at the time of the accident 
the manufacturer knew or  should have known of an alternative design, 
which may be safer, is the manufacturer negligent if it does not retrofit its 
already sold products, or at least notify the owners of the product of the 
new design? [We do  not] think that the imposition of such a duty would 
be appropriate under established principles of negligence liability. 
Id. 
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recognized only where the product was sold in a dangerously 
defective condition, the risks of which only came to the 
manufacturer's attention after initial sale."'33 
Reaching a conflicting decision, but on facts distinguishable in 
significant respects from the above authority is the decision in 
134 Downing v. Ouerhead Door Corp., a suit against the manufacturer of 
a garage door opener that had an activator button within the reach 
of children. Learning of the risks involved, the manufacturer 
undertook to warn new purchasers of the product, but did not 
warn previous purchasers. Rejecting the defendant's argument that 
its warning duties extended only to new purchasers, the Colorado 
Appeals Court stated, in terms applicable to warning and recall 
obligations alike: 
The duty to warn exists where a danger concerning the 
product becomes known to the manufacturer subsequent 
to the sale and delivery of the product, even though it was 
not known at the time of the sale. After a product 
involving human safety has been sold and dangerous 
defects in design have come to the manufacturer's 
attention, the manufacturer has a duty either to remedy 
such defects, or, if a complete remedy is not feasible, to 
give users adequate warnings and instructions concerning 
methods for minimizing danger.''' 
Downing has been interpreted as pertaining only to products 
that were defective at the time of manufacture, not to products 
"which could subsequently be made safer by a later developed 
safety device or design improvement."'36 In agreement with this 
limiting assessment of Downing is the Tenth Circuit decision in 
137 Romero u. International Harvester Co., an action arising from the 
133. Seegenerally Romero v. Int'l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1992). 
E.g., Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[A] product 
can only be defective if it is imperfect when measured against a standard existing 
at the time of sale or against reasonable consumer expectations held at the time of 
sale."); Dion v. Ford Motor Co., 804 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) ("Ford 
did not have a duty to improve upon the safety of its tractor by replacing an 
existing rollover protection system within improved rollover protection systems."); 
Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(applying Missouri law, and holding that defendant was "not negligent as a matter 
of law in failing to retrofit the allegedly defective aerial bucket lift"). 
134. 707 P.2d 1027 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). 
135. Id. at 1033 (citations omitted). 
136. Romero v. Int'l Harvester Co., 979 F. 2d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(applying Colorado law). 
137. Id. 
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death of a farm worker while using a tractor, manufactured and 
sold in 1963 without a roll bar (or ROPS - Roll-Over Protection 
System). Although at the time of its manufacture the tractor met all 
of the applicable government and industry standards for safety, 
plaintiff, noting laterdeveloped rollover protection devices, 
claimed the manufacturer was negligent in failing to retrofit the 
equipment. Observing that Colorado law recognized no "rigid 
distinction" between claims in negligent failure to warn and strict 
liability failure to warn, and further interpreting plaintiffs warnings 
claims as co-extensive with the claims in failure to retrofit, the court 
concluded that no Colorado authority supported the proposition 
that a claim against a manufacturer "should be exempted from 
having to show a negligent or defective design under standards 
existing at the time of manufacture and sale. . . . ,,IS8 In Oja v. 
139 Howmedica, Inc., the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in 
Romero, and held that no post-sale duty to warn or otherwise 
remedy a claimed hazard extended to a manufacturer when the 
product was not defective at the point of initial sale."'40 
The Michigan Supreme Court confirmed the absence of a 
manufacturer's post-sale duty to recall or repair an allegedly 
141 defective product in Gregmy v. Cincinnati, Inc., an action deriving 
from a sheet metal worker's injuries while operating a press brake. 
The defect pleaded was in the brake's allegedly inadequate 
guarding of the "point of operation," and also the lack of a guard 
to prevent inadvertent activation of the product with its foot 
At trial, the jury was instructed that a manufacturer "has a 
duty to incorporate new advances in technology[,] and that 'a 
manufacturer who learns of a design defect after the product has 
138. Id. at 1452. 
139. 111 F.3d 782 (10th Cir. 1997). 
140. Id. at 791 (quoting Perlmutler v. United States Gypsum Co., 4 F.3d 864, 
869 (10th Cir. 1993)) (claim alleging defective hip prosthesis). Accord Anderson v. 
Nissan Motor Co., 139 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Nebraska law to a claim 
brought by an injured employee who alleged that defendant's forklift was defective 
for want of an operator restraint system). The court stated: 
The Nebraska S u ~ r e m e  Court has not s~ecificallv addressed the issue of 
whether it would recognize either a post-sale duty to warn or  a duty to 
retrofit. The district court determined that, when called upon to decide 
the issue, the Nebraska Supreme Court would not be likely to recognize 
either cause of action. After a d e  novo review, we agree with the district 
court's determination.. . . 
Id. at 602. 
141. 538 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 1995). 
142. Id. at 327. 
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been sold has a duty to take reasonable steps to correct the 
ttt149 defect. A Michigan appeals court reversed and remanded, and, 
144 
reviewing Comstock. v. General Motors C*., held that while "a 
manufacturer has a duty to warn of a latent defect, [it] does not 
have a duty to repair a latent defect."'45 Noting that the issue 
presented was one of "public policy," appropriate for the legislature 
to address,'46 the court distinguished the settings in which this 
issue might arise: (1) a defect known to the manufacturer at the 
point of manufacture, i.e., while the product was yet in the 
manufacturer's control; and (2) the absence of a defect, in terms of 
the state of the art at the time of manufacture, but with post-sale 
advancements in technology rendering the product arguably 
defective under subsequent analysis.14' Finding that appellant's 
allegation of defect did not pertain to a latent point-of-manufacture 
defect, but rather a "defect" by dint of technological advances, the 
Michigan Supreme Court distinguished Comstock, and found no 
duty to repair or recall under Michigan law.14' 
The Michigan court further noted that adoption of a recall 
or retrofit duty would muddy the factfinder consideration of the 
issue of design defect, and explained: "Because a prima facie case 
[of design defect] is established once the risk-utility test is proven, 
we are persuaded that it is unnecessary and unwise to impose or 
introduce an additional duty to retrofit or recall a product. 
Focusing on post-manufacture conduct in a negligent design case 
improperly shifts the focus from point-of-manufacture conduct and 
considers post-manufacture conduct and technology that 
accordin 1 has the potential to taint a jury's verdict regarding a 
defect."14 F Y  
Similarly, when a product is not defective at the time of 
143. Id. at 328. 
144. 99 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. 1959). 
145. Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 328. 
146. Id. at 330. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 334. The court stated: 
At issue in this case is the propriety of a continuing duty to repair or 
recall theory of products liability in a negligent design case. The inquiry 
is whether Michigan law recognizes a continuing duty to repair or 
recall.. .We hold that there is no continuing duty to repair or recall.. .a 
product. 
Id. at 336; see also Patton v. Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299 (Kan. 1993) 
(interpreting Kansas law in reaching conclusion similar to that in Orego~y). 
149. Gregory, 538 N.W.2d at 333. 
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manufacture, but is subsequently made safer by advancements in 
technology, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Reeves v. 
Cincinnati, ~nc.'~' that a manufacturer has no duty to advise former 
purchasers of the existence or the availability of such 
advancements.15' The Reeues court relied on Gregory and reasoned 
that as Michigan does not impose a duty upon manufacturers to 
remedy defects after sale, it follows that the manufacturer should 
have no duty to inform consumers of new safety features for non- 
defective products.'52 The court concluded by observing that the 
party in control of the product, not the manufacturer, was in the 
best position to know of the advisability of incorporating any later- 
153 developed safety features. 
As discussed in the previous section, in McDanieE v. ~ i e f f e , , ' ~ ~  a 
federal trial court, applying Minnesota law, held that Minnesota 
would recognize a post-sale duty to warn in the context of a later- 
discovered latent defect in a mass-produced product, in that 
instance a motorcycle helmet, only upon a demonstration that the 
harm that could be suffered was grave, and that there were present 
other "special circumstances" identified by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in an earlier holding. Plaintiffs in that suit also opposed 
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the count of 
plaintiffs' complaint alleging that the manufacturer had breached a 
post-sale duty to recall the product. 
In contrast to its denial of summary judgment on plaintiffs 
post-sale warnings count, the trial court granted defendant 
summary judgment on the recall count, stating: 'While no 
Minnesota court has addressed this issue directly, this Court is 
convinced that Minnesota would refuse to impose a duty on 
manufacturers to recall and/or retrofit a defective product because 
the overwhelming minority of other jurisdictions have rejected 
such an ~bli~ation."'~'  To similar effect is the decision of the Third 
150. 528 N.W.2d 787 (1995) (injury sustained in operation of press brake). 
151. Id. at 788. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 790. 
154. 35 F. Supp. 2d 735 (D. Minn. 1999). 
155. Id. at 743, and summarizing this authority: Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 
944 P.2d 1279, 12981300 (Haw. 1997) (collecting authority and stating that 
"virtually every court that has confronted the issue head-on" has rejected this 
duty); Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497,508 n.16 (8th Cir. 1993) (no duty under 
Iowa law), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1115 (1994); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers 
Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's 
conclusion that Missouri does not recognize a duty to retrofit); Gregory v. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Habecher v. Copperloy, ~ 0 r p . I ~ ~  
That a manufacturer has no general duty to redesign a 
product was reiterated in the Third Circuit opinion of LeJeune v. 
157 Bliss-Salem, Inc., a claim arising from injuries suffered by a worker 
in the course of operating a steel mill's transport line. Plaintiff 
alleged that the supplier of the mill's electrical drive and control 
system, and the general contractor, had a duty to redesign the line 
in the course of their work in furtherance of reopening the mill. 
Defendants countered that the contracts governing the work 
"simply required them to put the mill machinery back into working 
order and that any duty on their part did not extend to 
reevaluating the safety aspects of the various machinery inv~lved ." '~~  
Affirming summary judgment, the appeals court wrote: "Due to the 
limited nature of the contractual undertaking in this case, no duty 
in tort arose on the part of [a] ppellees to redesi n safety features of 
the equipment or to warn of potential hazards." E 9  
A special relationship between the seller and the buyer may, in 
limited circumstances, be interpreted as triggering a duty to recall 
or repair. A leading decision supporting this proposition is Bell 
Helicopter v. ~ r a h h a w , ' ~  in which the defendant manufactured and 
sold a helicopter with rotor blades that were, at the time of the 
1961 sale, state of the art. In 1968, the defendant undertook the 
safety measure of updating the blades. Following a 1975 accident, 
the court found that the manufacturer's conduct in replacing the 
blades had created a post-sale duty to remediate unreasonable 
product risks. In the court's words: 
Where the record reflects, as in this case, an apparent 
assumption of such a duty by a manufacturer, it is not 
wholly improper for us to measure its conduct against 
such a duty with respect to plaintiffs allegations of post- 
manufacture negligence. Here, the defendant assumed 
the duty to improve the safety of its helicopter by 
replacing the 102 system with the 117 system. Once the 
duty was assumed, the defendant had an obligation to 
complete the remedy by using reasonable means available 
to it to cause replacement of the 102 systems with 117 
Cincinnati, 538 N.W.2d 325,334 (Mich. 1995) (no continuing duty to recall). 
156. 893 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
157. 85 F.3d 1069 (3d. Cir. 1996) (applying Delaware law). 
158. Id. at 1071. 
159. Id. at 1074. 
160. 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). 
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systems. 
IV. STATUTORY RECALL, REPAIR, REPORTING OR REFUND 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETYACT SECTION 15 
The first sections to this article discuss a seller's limited post- 
sale duties to warn regarding a product's unreasonably dangerous 
condition, and in even more limited settings, a post-sale duty to 
recall or repair. This section describes federal post-sale 
informational or remedial obligations to which a manufacturer may 
be subject, and specifically, recall, repair, or refund obligations 
under the Consumer Product Safety Act ("CPSA) .I6' Consumer 
Product Safety Act section 15 requires firms to report to the 
Commission whenever a product is or even might create a 
"substantial product hazard," and gives the Commission broad 
163 powers to command product recalls under certain circumstances. 
Both recall and reporting requirements are keyed to the 
phrase "substantial product hazard." A recall can be required when 
a product is found "actually" to constitute a substantial product 
hazard, but a report to the Commission is also required when a 
product "could" be a substantial product hazard. Specifically, 
CPSA section 15 requires a subject firm to notify the Commission 
that its product: (1) does not comply with an applicable consumer 
product safety rule, or (2) contains a "defect" which could create a 
"substantial risk of injury to the public" and therefore presents a 
substantial product hazard.164 When either the failure to comply 
161. Id. at 532. 
162. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. 55 2051-2084 (1994)). 
163. Id. 
164. 15 U.S.C.A. section 2064(a) (1998) defines "substantial product hazard" 
as: 
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule 
which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or 
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number 
of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or 
otherwise) creates substantial risk of injury to the public. 
Section 2064(b) describes action to be taken upon discovery of potentially unsafe 
products: 
Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and 
every distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information 
which reasonably supports the conclusion that such product: (1) fails to 
comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule or with a 
voluntary consumer product safety standard upon which the Commission 
has relied under [15 U.S.C.A.5 20581 of this title; or (2) contains a defect 
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with the rule or the actual defect creates a substantial risk of injury 
to the public and therefore constitutes a substantial product 
hazard, CPSA section 15 further authorizes the Commission, after a 
hearing, to order a firm to provide notice of any such hazard to the 
public, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and purchasers 
(including consumers), and further to order replacement, repair, 
or refund of the purchase price, less a reasonable allowance for 
use. In addition to providing for voluntary remedial action, 
including "corrective action plans" and consent agreements, CPSA 
section 15 gives the Commission authority to seek injunctive relief 
to prevent further distribution of an allegedly dangerous product. 
Failure to furnish information required by CPSA section 15 (b) 
is prohibited under section 19(a)(4) of the Act, and a knowing 
violation of CPSA section 19(a) (4) may subject the violator to civil 
165 penalties. A separate violation can be found with respect to each 
consumer product involved. A knowing violation of CPSA section 
19 following a Commission Notice of Noncompliance can subject 
the violator to criminal penalties under CPSA section 2 1 . ' ~ ~  NO 
private cause of action accrues against the manufacturer or seller 
which could create a substantial product hazard described in subsection 
(a)(2) of this section; or (3) creates an unreasonable risk of serious 
injury or death, shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure 
to comply, of such defect, or of such risk, unless such manufacturer, 
distributor, or retailer has actual knowledge that the Commission has 
been adequately informed of such defect, failure to comply, o r  such risk. 
Id. at § 2064(b). 
165. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2068, provides in pertinent part: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to: (1) manufacture for sale, offer 
for sale, distribute in commerce, or import into the United States any 
consumer product which is not in conformity with an applicable 
consumer product safety standard under this chapter; (2) manufacture 
for sale, offer for sale, distribute in commerce, o r  import into the United 
States any consumer product which has been declared a banned 
hazardous product by a rule under this chapter; (3) fail o r  refuse to 
permit access to or  copying of records, o r  fail or refuse to establish or  
maintain records, o r  fail or refuse to make reports o r  provide 
information, or  fail o r  refuse to permit entry or inspection, as required 
under this Act or  rule thereunder; (4) fail to furnish information 
required by section 2064(b); (5) fail to comply with an order issued 
(relating to notification, and to repair, replacement, and refund, and to 
prohibited acts). 
166. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2070(a) (1998), provides that "(a) Any person who 
knowingly and willfully violates § 2068 of this Act after having received notice of 
noncompliance from the Commission shall be fined not more than $50,000 or be 
imprisoned not more than one year, o r  both." 
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167 for failure to n o w  the Commission in a timely manner. 
The first prong of the definition of "substantial product 
hazard" sets up an automatic reporting requirement: if the product 
fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule, it 
must be reported whether or not the non-compliance is likely to 
cause injury. A consumer product safety rule is defined to include 
"a consumer product safety standard described in [16 U.S.C. § 
20561, or a rule under this cha ter declaring a consumer product a P banned hazardous product." GB Thus, standards such as the 
architectural glass standardI6' and bans such as that governing some 
refuse bins170 are both included under the rubric of a consumer 
product safety standard or rule. 
Because of the limited number of product safety standards and 
product bans, Commission enforcement of CPSA section 15 has 
focused primarily on the provisions of section 15 (b) (2) .I7' Section 
15 (b) (2) requires a report when a product "contains a defect which 
could create a substantial product hazard" as described in section 
15 (a). Section 15 (a) defines a substantial product hazard as: 
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer 
product safety rule which creates a substantial risk of 
injury to the public, or 
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of 
defect, the number of defective products distributed in 
commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a 
172 
substantial risk of injury to the public. 
Under sections 15 (a) (2) and 15 (b) (2) , therefore, two 
principal questions must be resolved in determining whether a 
particular product could create a substantial product hazard: First, 
is there a product "defect"? Second, if so, does this defect create a 
substantial risk of injury to the public because of the pattern of the 
defect, the number of defective products distributed in commerce, 
the severity of the risk, or otherwise? Both of these questions will 
be treated in order, followed by a discussion of various other 
questions raised by the statute and implementing regulations, such 
167. E.g., Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 898 F.2d 1452, 1457 (10th 
Cir.1990) (survivors of six-year-old girl killed in ATV accident had no private cause 
of action under CPSA for alleged manufacturer's failure to report). 
168. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052 (1998). 
169. 16 C.F.R. 5 1201 (2000). 
170. Id. at 5 1301. 
171. CSPAsection 15(b);15U.S.C.A.§2064(b). 
172. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(b) ( I ) ,  (2) (1998). 
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as who must make a report, and what information must be 
reported. 
Absent an applicable consumer product safety rule, the first 
question to be resolved in deciding whether a section 15 report is 
needed is whether the product contains a "defect." The 
Commission's section 15 rules do not attempt to define "defect,"'73 
but opt for a brief interpretation accompanied by illustrative 
examples. The section describes defect as including, at a 
minimum, the commonly accepted dictionary meaning of the 
word. In general terms, the rules continue, a defect is a "fault, flaw, 
or irregulari that causes weakness, failure, or inadequacy in form 3r 
or function." l4 
The rules set out several representative illustrations of product 
defects: (1) manufacturing or production defects, such as an 
electric-appliance casing that can, through manufacturing error, be 
electrically charged by full-line voltage; (2) labeling and marketing 
defects"' such as athletic shoes advertised for, but unsuited to, 
173. In preparing the final regulations the Commission was persuaded by the 
concern of many commentators that a comprehensive Commission definition of 
"defect" would be applied by courts in civil products liability disputes, possibly 
increasing the financial exposure of subject firms. The Commission accordingly 
included the following language in the final version of the regulation: "Defect, as 
discussed in this section and used by the Commission and staff, pertains only to 
interpreting and enforcing the Consumer Product Safety Act. The criteria and 
discussion in this section are not intended to apply to any other areas of law." 16 
C.F.R. 5 1115.4 (1980) (2000). 
174. Id. The section continues: 
~ ~ 
A defect, for example, may be the result of a manufacturing or 
production error, that is, the consumer product as manufactured is not 
in the form intended by, or fails to perform in accordance with, its 
design. In addition, the design of and the materials used in a consumer 
product may also result in a defect. Thus, a product may contain a defect 
even if the product is manufactured exactly in accordance with its design 
and specifications, if the design presents a risk of injury to the public. A 
design defect may also be present if the risk of injuly occurs as a result of 
the operation or use of the product or the failure of the product to 
operate as intended. A defect can also occur in a product's contents, 
construction, finish, packaging, warnings, and/or instructions. With 
respect to instructions, a consumer product may contain a defect if the 
instructions for assembly or use could allow the product, otherwise safely 
designed and manufactured, to present a risk of injury. 
Id. 
175. The term "marketing" is the Commission's. While the CPSA does not vest 
the Commission with authority to impose "marketing" requirements as such, it 
does, in CPSA section 7(a)(2)(B), authorize Commission promulgation of 
standards which may include "[rlequirements that a consumer product be marked 
with or accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or instructions, or 
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running and that cause muscle or tendon injury; (3) defects due to 
inadequate warnings and instructions, such as a power tool without 
adequate instructions or safety warnings, even in the absence of 
reported injuries, where foreseeable use or misuse could result in 
injury based in part on such informational inadequacies; and (4) 
defects due to consumer reliance and product non-performance, 
such as a garage exhaust fan advertised to activate when fumes 
- - 
reach a dangerous level, but that fails, for whatever reason, to do 
176 SO. 
In addition to describing manufacturing, design, labeling 
(including warning labels), and marketing defects, the 
Commission's discussion of defects implies a balancing test of utility 
and risk, using the example of a metalicized kite and an ordinary 
kitchen knife to illustrate the risk/utility evaluation. According to 
the Commission, while the foil finish of a metalicized kite may be 
attractive, and the kite may fly better for its added weight, because 
the kite can conduct electricity from air to ground and can 
foreseeably become tangled with power lines, it is defective within 
the meaning of section 15 (a), even if designed, manufactured, and 
marketed as intended.17' 
Consumer Product Safety Act section 15 applies to all 
"consumer Section 15 (b) imposes reporting 
requirements upon "[elvery manufacturer of a consumer product 
distributed in commerce, and every distributor and retailer of such 
product." Importers are included in the section 3(a) (4) definition 
of 1tman~fact~rer~.11179 
Firms which have received reportable information must file an 
Initial ~ e ~ o r t . ' ~ ~  Manufacturers and importers must also file a 
subsequent Full ~ e ~ 0 r t . I ~ '  Distributors or retailers who are neither 
manufacturers nor importers of the products in question are 
requirements respecting the form of warnings or instructions." 15 U.S.C.A. 3 
2056(a) (2) (1998). 
176. 16C.F.R.§1115.4(a)(b)(d)&(e) .  
177. Id. at fj 1115.4(c). 
178. Consumer products are defined by the Act to include: "[Alny article, or 
component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for 
use in or around a permanent or temporaIy household or residence, a school, in 
recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment 
of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a 
school, in recreation, or otherwise. . . ." CPSA § 3(a) (1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a) (1). 
179. 15 U.S.C.A. 5 2052(a),(4) (1976). 
180. 16 C.F.R. at § 1115.13(c). 
181. Id. at 5 1115.13(d). 
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subject to the reporting requirements of section 15(b) but can 
satisfy their notification obligations by complying with the less 
comprehensive reporting requirements of an Initial ~ e ~ o r t . ' ' ~  
Additionally, reporting is required of a firm when it has obtained 
information which reasonably supports the conclusion that a 
product fails to comply with a voluntary consumer product safety 
standard upon which the Commission has relied under section 9 of 
the CPSA, or creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or 
death. A manufacturer, distributor, or retailer is not relieved of 
this obligation unless it has actual knowledge that the Commission 
has already been adequately in f~rmed ."~  
Reporting obligations under section 15(b) are triggered by 
product noncompliance or by the existence of a substantial 
product hazard in any consumer product "distributed in 
commerce." Section 3(a) (1 1) of the Act states that " [t] he terms 'to 
distribute in commerce' and 'distribution in commerce' means to 
sell in commerce, to introduce or deliver for introduction into 
commerce, or to hold for sale or distribution after introduction 
into ~ornrnerce."~'~ 
A firm must immediately, i.e., within twenty-four hours, report 
information which reasonably supports the conclusion that a 
substantial product hazard may exist.''' In recognition of variable 
weight that is properly attached to different types of product safety 
related information, the rules set out certain information which, in 
the Commission's view, reasonably supports the conclusion that a 
186 
report is necessary. Other categories of information which are of 
uncertain substantiality must nevertheless be probed to determine 
if they "reasonably support the conclusion" that a substantial 
product hazard may exist.''' A subject firm must immediately 
report information which indicates "that a noncompliance or a 
182. Id. at 5 1115.13(b). 
183. The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 1990 ("Improvement 
Act" ), Pub. L. 101-608, § 1, 104 Stat. 3110, amended section 15(b) of the CPSA, 
broadening its triggering mechanisms with the inclusion of the two provisions 
above. Prior to the 1990 Amendments, reporting noncompliance or risk of 
serious injury or death was not required unless the noncompliance or  risk created 
a product defect which could create a substantial product hazard as described in 
CPSA subsection 15(a) (2). 
184. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2052(a) (11). 
185. CPSAS 15(b), 15 U.S.C.A. 5 2064(b); 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14(e). 
186. Examples of the kind of information required are set out in 16 C.F.R. § 
1115.12(a). 
187. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1115.12(a)-1115.12(e) (1980). 
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defect in a consumer product has caused, may have caused, or 
contributed to the causing, or could cause or contribute to the 
causing of a death or grievous bodily injury. . . unless the firm has 
"investigated and determined that the information is not 
The reporting requirements attached to the risk of serious 
injury or death from a product are preventative by design. The fact 
that, absent an actual serious injury or death, no final 
determination as to the existence of such risks may be possible has 
no bearing on a firm's obligation to evaluate whatever information 
is available to it in terms of whether it reasonably supports a finding 
that the risks do exist.lsg The standard regarding a potential 
obligation to report risk of serious injury or death is this: could a 
reasonable person conclude, given the information available, that a 
product creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death. In 
making such a determination, a firm is permitted to balance a 
series of risk-utility factors, as well as to determine the 
reasonableness of a conclusion that a product violates a standard or 
ban promulgated under the FHSA, FFA, PPPA or RSA, to the 
extent that it could result in a serious injury or death.Ig0 
Even in the absence of a death or grievous bodily injury, the 
rules state that "other information may indicate a reportable defect 
or noncompliance," and that the subject firm may be held 
responsible for knowledge which could be derived by a "reasonable 
and prudent manufa~turer."'~' The regulations offer specific 
illustrations of the types of information a firm should consider in 
deciding whether or not to report. These include information 
188. Id. at § 1115.12(c). The regulations set out the following examples of 
grievous bodily injury: "[Mlutilation, amputation/dismemberment, disfigurement, 
loss of important bodily functions, debilitating internal disorders, severe bums, 
severe electrical shocks, and injuries likely to require extended hospitalization." 
Id. 
189. 16 C.F.R. 8 1115.6(a). 
190. Id. at § (b). 
191. "In evaluating whether or when a subject firm should have reported, the 
Commission will deem a subject firm to know what a reasonable and prudent 
manufacturer (including an importer) distributor, o r  retailer would know." 16 
C.F.R. § 1115.12(e). In addition, the fact that a product fails to comply with a 
standard must immediately be reported to the CPSC under § 15(b), pursuant to 
the guidance of 16 C.F.R. § 1115.2(b), "unless the manufacturer (including an 
importer), distributor or retailer has actual knowledge that the Commission has 
been adequately informed of such failure to comply, defect, o r  risk. This 
provision indicates that a broad spectrum of safety related information should be 
reported under section 15(b) of the CPSA." 
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concerning: 
[El ngineering, quality control, or production 
data.. .safety-related production or design change(s) . . . 
[p] roduct liability suits.. .independent testing laboratory 
[results] . . . [c] omplaints from a consumer or consumer 
group.. . [i] nformation received from the Commission or 
other governmental agency.. . [or] [i] nformation received 
from other firms, including requests to return a product 
or for replacement or credit.lg2 
The last-described category, the regulations provide, "includes both 
requests made by distributors and retailers to the manufacturer and 
requests from the manufacturer that products be ret~rned."'~' 
Unless the information is clearly reportable, the firm can 
spend a reasonable time, not to exceed ten days, for investigation 
194 
and evaluation. Recognizing that reportable information may be 
sketchy or unconfirmed, and to encourage the earliest possible 
reporting, the regulations state in its report to the CPSA "[a] 
subject firm . . . need not admit, or may specifically deny, that the 
information it submits reasonably supports the conclusion that its 
consumer product is non-complying, contains a defect that could 
create a substantial product hazard within the meaning of [CPSA 
section 15(b)], or creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or 
death.ltlg5 
Initial reports must be filed immediately, that is, within 24 
196 hours, after a subject firm has obtained information which 
reasonably supports the conclusion" that a product "fails to comply 
with an applicable consumer product safety rule or voluntary 
consumer product safety standard, contains a defect which could 
create a substantial risk of injury to the public, or creates an 
unreasonable risk of serious injury or death."lg7 Initial reports 
which are not in writing must be confirmed in writing within 
forty-eight hours of the non-written report.Ig8 
192. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(f). 
193. Id. at § 115.12(f) (7) 
194. 16 C.F.R. 5 1115.14(d). 
195. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(a). 
196. Weekends and holidays are excluded from these calculations. Id. at § 
1115.14(a). 
197. Id. at § 1115.14(e). 
198. Id. at § 1115.13(c). The earlier rules required a covered firm to make an 
initial notification to the Commission within 24 hours of receiving information 
which reasonably supported the conclusion that there was a substantial product 
hazard. Id. § 1115.14(e). The initial notification would identify the product in 
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Where the subject firm learns of a death, grievous bodily 
injury, or other possibly reportable information, the regulations 
state that the firm must investigate and evaluate the information 
within ten days unless the firm "can demonstrate that a longer 
period is reas~nable." '~~ The Commission deems that "at the end of 
ten days, a subject firm has received and considered all information 
which would have been available to it had a reasonable, 
expeditious, and diligent investigation been undertaken. "200 When 
a subject firm has not notified the Commission in a timely fashion 
within the meaning of section 15 and the regulations, the 
Commission may seek assessment of civil penalties under section 
20. 
A firm is not required to file a section 15(b) report if it 
possesses "actual knowledge that the Commission has been 
adequately informed of such defect, failure to comply, or such 
risk."201 The Commission is adequately informed when "the 
Commission staff has received the information (provided in Initial 
Reports and Final Reports) *** insofar as it is reasonably available 
and applicable[, or] the st& has informed the subject firm that the 
staff is adequately informed."202 
Part 6 of UCC Article 2 pertains to breach, repudiation and 
excuse under the UCC sales provisions, and provides special buyer 
remedies where the buyer receives one or more products that are 
non-conforming. As defective products not duly safe for their 
intended use have been considered "not for their ordinary 
purpose" within the meaning of UCC § 2-314(c), so too the Code 
provisions governing "non-conforming" goods have been 
interpreted as including within their compass products that create 
an unreasonable risk of injury to persons or property. 
In a single delivery contract, upon the seller's tender of the 
defective product, the buyer may reject the product if it "fail[s] in 
any respect to conform to the contract."203 Whene the contract 
- 
question, describe the course of distribution, and "[slpecify the nature and extent 
of the defect or failure to comply." Id. §§ 1115.5(a) - 1115.5(e). 
199. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14(d). 
200. Id. 
201. CPSA § 15(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064 (1998). 
202. C.F.R. § 1115.3(a). 
203. U.C.C. § 2-601. Official Comment 2 thereto states in part: "[Tlhe buyer's 
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between the buyer and the seller is one providing for delivery of 
more than one commercial unit, the buyer may accept one or more 
of the units and reject the remainder.204 
Where the contract between the buyer and seller is one 
providing for satisfaction by installment, the buyer may reject an 
installment only where the defect "substantially impairs the value of 
,,205 the installment and cannot be cured. . . . Whether the nature of 
the defect, its scope, or both constitute a substantial impairment of , 
the contract is a very fact-specific question. For example, in 
206 Continental F m t  Products, Inc. v. White Lumber Sales, Inc., in which 
the installment contract called for rejection of goods revealing 
more than 5% deviation from the terms of the contract, and the 
seller's first carload showed 9% deviation, while the second had less 
than 596, the court held that the seller's non-conformity was a 
minor deviation not amounting to a substantial impairment. 
The buyer's remedy of rejection must be exercised within a 
reasonable time after delivery of the goods, and will be ineffective 
unless the buyer "seasonably" notifies the seller of the rejection.'07 
The notification must iden* the product inadequacies with 
particularity.208 What constitutes a reasonable time is ordinarily a 
question of facto9 and will be affected by the nature of the 
It has been held that a buyer makes a timely rejection 
attempts in good faith to dispose of defective goods where the seller has failed to 
give instructions within a reasonable time are not to be regarded as an 
acceptance." Id. See generally discussion of these warranty remedies in Alperin & 
Chase, Consumer Law, Sales Practices and Credit Regulation 5 251 et  seq. 
204. U.C.C. § 2-601 (c). 
205. U.C.C. § 2-612(2). Subsection (3) to U.C.C. § 2-612 states in pertinent 
part: "Whenever nonconformity or default with respect to one o r  more 
installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a breach 
of the whole." 
206. 474 P.2d 1 (Or. 1970). 
207. U.C.C. § 2-602; see generally Knic Knac Agencies v. Masterpiece Apparel, 
Ltd., No. 94 CIV. 1073(LMM), 1999 WL 156379, at "7 (S.D.N.Y. March 22, 1999) 
(rejection seasonably made as recipient did not particularize defects). 
208. Id; see also U.C.C. § 2-605 (stating "[tlhe buyer's failure to state in 
connection with rejection a particular defect that is ascertainable by reasonable 
inspection precludes him from relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection 
or to establish breach . . . (a)where the seller could have cured it if stated 
seasonably"). 
209. Buckeye Trophy, Inc. v. S. Bowling & Billiard Supply Co., 443 N.E.2d 
1043,1046 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (finding the passage of 65 days does not, by itself, 
establish that rejection thereafter was not within reasonable time); U.C.C. 5 1- 
204(2) (stating "what is a reasonable time for taking any action depends upon the 
nature, purpose and circumstances of such action."). 
210. See generally 4 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-602:17. E.g., 
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of goods where the rejection is made within twenty-four hours of 
tender,"' or within one week."' Even a delay of two months has 
been held to present a jury issue as to timeliness when the 
nonconformity or defect was not patent and the product was 
shipped una~sembled.~'~ 
The UCC also sets forth the means by which the seller, in 
certain circumstances, may "cure" its delivery of a defective 
product. The seller's "cure" must be in accordance with UCC 
section 2-508, which provides that upon delivery of a product that is 
defective or otherwise non-conforming, and whene the time for 
compliance with the terms of the contract of sale has not expired, 
the seller "may reasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure 
and may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery. 
,214 
... 
Lastly, the buyer in receipt of a defective product may revoke 
acceptance of the A valid "revocation of acceptance" vests 
in the buyer "the same rights and duties with regards to the duties 
Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968), 531 F.Supp. 
1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (time for rejecting live animal shorter than that for 
inanimate object). 
211. Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455, 459 (M.D .Pa.1972). 
212. Glen O'Brien Moveable Partition Co., Inc. v. McMullen, 608 S.W.2d 512, 
520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
213. Sherkate Sahami Khass Rapol (Rapol Contr. Co.) v. Henry R. Jahn & Son, 
Inc., 701 F.2d 1049, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1983). 
214. U.C.C. 5 2-508(1); see also RAY D. HENSON, THE LAW OF SALES § 4.02 at 125- 
28 (1985); ROBERT J. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 5 105 at 317-22 
(1970). 
215. For example, Maryland Commercial Code Article 6 5 2-608 provides: 
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot o r  commercial unit 
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he as 
accepted it: 
(a) On the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured 
and it has not been seasonablv cured: or 
(b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was 
reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance 
or  by the seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after 
the buyer discovers or  should have discovered the ground for it and 
before any substantial change in the condition of the goods which is not 
caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the 
seller of it. 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to 
the goods involved as if he had rejected them. 
See also discussion in Hardy v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 706 A.2d 1086, 1091-92 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). 
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involved as if he had rejected them [;I "'I6 thus, in effect, reinstating 
the seller as the owner of the chattel. A breach of warranty may 
establish a nonconformity sufficient to trigger the buyer's right to 
217 
revoke acceptance. The revocation of acceptance remedy 
remains, however, conceptually distinct from that of a claim for 
breach of warranty,'I8 and a jury instruction that "intertwine [s] " 
the warranty remedy and the revocation of acceptance remedy 
constitutes reversible error.219 
Unlike rejection, which the UCC provides as a remedy for 
ordinary non-conformity of the goods, revocation of acceptance 
may only be had where the non-conformity or defective nature of 
the goods "substantially impairs its value" to the buyer."0 In 
addition to requiring a showing of substantial impairment, the 
revocation of acceptance remedy differs from the antecedent right 
to reject the goods in these respects: the buyer (1) in accepting 
initially, (a) must, if the defect had already been discovered, have 
proceeded on the reasonable assumption that the seller would 
cure; or (b) if the defect had not been discovered, must have been 
induced to the acceptance by the difficulty in ascertainment of the 
defect or by the conduct of the seller; (2) must revoke acceptance 
within a reasonable time; and (3) must revoke before a substantial 
216. Id. at 1091. 
217. Campbell Farms v. Wald, 578 N.W.2d 96,99 (N.D. 1998). Campbell Farms 
was a suit brought by bull buyers for damages and return of the purchase price of 
a bull whose reproductive capacity, the buyers claimed, fell short of a sales 
brochure's representation of the animal as an "active breeder. . . ." Id. 
218. Murray v. D & J Motor Co. Inc., 958 P.2d 823, 828 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998) 
("The right t6 revokedoes not depend upon the existence or breach of any 
warranty. The buyer may revoke. . . even though all warranties are excluded. . . . 
") (quoting Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc. 638 P.2d 210 (1981)); 
Breitung v. Canzano, 660 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (involving 
claimed breach of warranty of title and buyer's endeavor to revoke acceptance of 
an automobile, with court commenting that breach of warranty and revocation of 
acceptance "constitute separate causes of action, have independent notice and 
procedure requirements, and if successful, result in different remedies."). 
219. Breitung. v. Canzano, 660 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (claim 
alleging false representation of vehicle mileage and vehicle registration number). 
220. U.C.C. § 2-608; Campbell v. Pollack, 221 A.2d 615, 619 (R.I. 1966) 
(discussing the meaning of substantial impairment); see also Conte v. Dwan 
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 148 (Conn. 1976) (noting that revocation is 
possible when the impairment substantially reduces value of a good); Durfee v. 
Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 35455 (Minn. 1977) (revocation is 
acceptable if seller does not correct impairment within a "reasonable time"); 
Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 186 S.E.2d 161 (N.C. 1972), appeal after 
remand, 201 S.E.2d 513 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974); Lee R. Russ, Annotation, What 
Constitutes "Substantial Impairment " ,  38 A.L.R.~TH 19 1 (1 996). 
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change not related to the defect occurs in the goods.221 Issues of 
non-conformity with contract, substantial impairment, and 
timeliness of notice to the seller are ordinarily questions of fact.222 
VI. AUTOMOBILE LEMON LAWS 
Prior to the widespread adoption of lemon lawszz3 courts in 
many jurisdictions demonstrated a solicitude towards the claims of 
purchasers whose vehicles, most frequently automobiles, were 
discovered to have a material and incurable defect.224 In so doing, 
some decisions seemingly stretched into unrecognizability the UCC 
section 2-608(2) requirement that revocation be within a 
"reasonable time."225 Another means by which courts favored the 
automobile owner whose warranty limited the remedy to repair and 
replacement of any inoperable parts was to examine the 
221. E.g., The Inn Between, Inc. v. Remanco Metro., Inc., 662 N.Y.S.2d 1011 
(N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1997). Inn Between involved the buyer's suit to revoke acceptance of 
a used restaurant computer system. The court held that the facts established that 
the product had sufficient nonconformities to justify remedy of revocation; that 
such nonconformities substantially impaired product's value; that seller failed to 
seasonably cure the nonconformities; and that the buyer revoked acceptance 
within a reasonable time. Id. at 101314. 
222. E.g., Murray v. D & J Motor Co., Inc., 958 P.2d 823, 826 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1998) ; see also Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 480 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Ark. 1972) ("What 
constitutes a nonconforming delivery, acceptance, rejection, or  revocation of 
acceptance are questions of fact. . . ."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Caizzo, 564 A.2d 
931,936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (stating that determining what is a reasonable time 
for rejection of goods after delivery is generally a question of fact). 
223. See generally Comment, Sweetening the Fate of the "Lemon" Owner: California 
and Connecticut Pass Legislation Dealing With Defective New Cars, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 
341 (1983). See also HOWARD J . ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW: SALES 
P R A ~ I C E S  AND CREDIT REGULATION § 218 (1986). 
224. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1293 (1993), defines 
"lemon" as "something or  someone that proves to be unsatisfactory or  undesirable: 
[synonymous with] dud, failure.. ." 
225. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 224 So. 2d 638,647 (Ala. 1969) ("Repeated 
attempts at adjustments having failed, we hold the buyer McMurtry revoked his 
acceptance of the automobile within a reasonable time."); Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Earnest, 184 So. 2d 811, 814 (Ala. 1966) ("We can agree with the appellee's 
contention that at some point after the purchase of a new automobile, the same 
should be put in good running condition .... This is no more than saying that at 
some point in time, it must become obvious to all people that a particular vehicle 
simply cannot be repaired or parts replaced so that the same is made free from 
defect."); Conte v. Dawn Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 374 A.2d 144, 149 (Conn. 1976) 
("Under the circumstances of this case, involving an almost continuous [fourteen- 
month] series of negotiations and repairs, the delay in the notice [to revoke] did 
not prejudice the dealer and was not unreasonable."); see also Douglas L. Elden, 
Revocation ofAcceptance: Interpetation and Application, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 14 (1975). 
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enforcement of such a limitation in the context of the product's 
overall failure. The warrantor's provision of the exclusive remedy 
of repair or replacement was often understood to "give the seller 
an opportunity to make the goods conforming while limiting the 
risks to which he is subject by excluding direct and consequential 
damages that might otherwise arise."226 Courts favoring the equities 
of the buyer's position frequently concluded that where the 
warrantor failed to correct the defect as promised within a 
reasonable time, he should be liable for breach of that warrar~ty,'~' 
or that and the limited, purportedly exclusive remedy of the seller 
failed of its essential purpose and was therefor avoidable under 
UCC section 2-719.'" 
Illustrative on this oint is the South Dakota decision in B Johnson v. John Deere C O . ~ ~  an action brought by the purchaser of a 
tractor which was built with the wrong sized bolts on the front 
wheels, and which suffered from oil leaks, transmission problems, 
internal engine malfunctions, and miscellaneous problems with 
water hoses, the fuel injection system, and the injector pump 
shaft.230 The trial court declined to identify any limitation upon the 
period of time within which the seller could successfully perform its 
226. Beal v. Gen. Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423,426 (D. Del. 1973). 
227. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150 (Ca1.1965); Steele v. J.I. Case 
Co., 419 P.2d 902, 908 (Kan. 1966). 
228. Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39,43-44 (N.D. 
Ill. 1970) : 
Although the plaintiff-buyer purchased and accepted the machinery and 
equipment with the apparent knowledge that the seller had limited its 
liability to repair or replacement, and although the plaintiff does not 
allege any form of unconscionability in the transactions which led to the 
purchase, plaintiff also was entitled to assume that defendants would not 
be unreasonable or wilfully dilatory in making good their warranty in the 
event of defects in the machinery and equipment. It is the specific 
breach of the warranty to repair that plaintiff alleges caused the bulk of 
its damages. This Court would be in an untenable position if it allowed 
the defendant to shelter itself behind one segment of the warranty when 
it has allegedly repudiated and ignored its very limited obligations under 
another segment of the same warranty, which alleged repudiation has 
caused the very need for relief which the defendant is attempting to 
avoid. If the plaintiff is capable of sustaining its burden of proof as to the 
allegations it has made, the defendant will be deemed to have repudiated 
the warranty agreement so far as restricting plaintiffs warranties, and the 
exclusive remedy provision of the contract will be deemed under the 
circumstances to have failed of its essential purpose, thus allowing 
plaintiff the general array of remedies under the Code. 
229. 306 N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1981). 
230. Id. at 234. 
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duties under the warranty's exclusive repair and replacement 
remedy, adding: "Now, you know the law won't protect you from a 
lemon, we know that. They will protect you from a breach of 
warranty. [Alnd I think under the state of this record that there 
' [has been] no unreasonable delay" in effectuating successful 
231 
repairs. 
In its review of the decisions below, the South Dakota Supreme 
Court examined the official notes to the UCC, as well as decisional 
law suggesting that the existence of the repair and replacement 
remedy was no license for the seller to make a career of 
unsuccessful efforts to make plaintiffs car operational.292 Reversing 
and remanding for trial the issue of whether unreasonable delay 
made the seller's warranty fail of its essential purpose, the state high 
court wrote: "After reviewing the record, we are inclined to agree 
with the trial court's characterization of the tractor as a 'lemon,' but 
we disagree that the law will not protect the purchaser of a lemon." 
Interestingly, the court decided against the purchaser on the claim 
that the exclusive remedy provision was unconscionable under 
UCC section 2 - 3 0 2 . ~ ~ ~  
231. Id. at 233. 
232. Steek, 419 P.2d at 907 ("An unsuccessful effort to remedy the defect 
renders the seller liable on his warranty; and the buyer is not bound to allow him a 
second opportunity, or to permit him to tinker with the article indefinitely in the 
hope that it may ultimately be made to comply with the warranty. . . . The vendor 
does not have an unlimited time for performance of its obligation to replace."); 
Beal, 354 F. Supp. at 427 n. 2 ("The limited remedy fails of its essential purpose 
whenever the seller fails to repair the goods within a reasonable time; good faith 
attempts to repair might be relevant to the issue of what constitutes a reasonable 
time."). 
233. rohnson. 306 N.W.2d at 238. The court stated: 
., 
The record clearly supports appellant's argument as to buyer's 
background, experience, and business acumen. More importantly, it 
supports their assertion that buyer had examined the New Equipment 
Warranty and was fully aware and willing to trade off the remedy for 
consequential loss for the warranty of replacement and repair. At trial 
appellant testified that when he purchased the tractor he realized that 
under the warranty, repairs would be made for most things within a given 
period of time, but that he was more interested in the service that he 
would receive once he had purchased the tractor. Thus, although the 
repair and replacement warranty may have subsequently failed of its 
essential purpose, thereby entitling him to general damages for breach of 
contract as outlined in the code, the limitation on remedy was not 
unconscionable at the time the contract was made, either procedurally or 
substantively, and he would not be entitled to recover consequential 
damages. 
Id.; see generally Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New 
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While the commercial code of most states restricts the seller's 
ability to limit or exclude the implied warranty of 
mer~hantability,~" an increasing number of others, in conjunction 
with or independent of that particular warranty reform, have 
passed so-called lemon laws to provide an expedited and 
intelligible remedy for the purchaser of an unmerchantable 
automobile, the problems with which the dealer and the 
manufacturer are unable to correct within a reasonable time. 
Ordinarily, remedies under such laws are predicated upon a 
showing that the defect or defects "substantially impair" the 
function, safety or value of the vehicle.235 Lemon laws are perhaps 
unique among consumer protection and products liability laws in 
their enjoyment of significant support from both consumers and 
from product manufacturers and other sellers.236 
Clause, 11 5 U .  PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
234. E.g., Kansas Consumer Protection Act, RS.A. 50-639: 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law with respect to property 
which is the subject of or is intended to become the subject of a 
consumer transaction in this state, no supplier shall: (1) Exclude, modify, 
or otherwise attempt to limit. . . the implied warranty of merchantability 
and fitness for a particular purpose...or (2) exclude; modify, or attempt 
to limit any remedy provided by law, including the measure of damages 
available, for a breach of implied warranty of merchantability and fitness 
for a particular purpose. .. (c) A supplier may limit the supplier's implied 
warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose with 
respect to a defect or defects in the property only if the supplier 
established that the consumer had knowledge of the defect or defects, 
which became the basis of the bargain between the parties ... (d) Nothing 
in this section shall be construed to expand the implied warranty of 
merchantability as defined in K.S.A. 842-314 ... to involve obligations in 
excess of those which are appropriate to the proper ty... (e) A disclaimer 
or limitation in violation of this section is void. If a consumer prevails in 
an action based upon a breach of warranty, and the supplier has violated 
this section, the court may, in addition to any damages recovered, award 
reasonable attorney's fees and a civil penalty under KS.A. 50-636, and 
amendments thereto, or both to be paid by the supplier who gave the 
improper disclaimer. (0 The makiniof a limited express warranty is not 
in itself a violation of this section. 
235. Jarvis v. Safari Motor Coaches, Inc., 670 N.Y.S.2d 927, 928-929 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1998) (showing of substantial impairment notwithstanding petitioner's ability 
"to use the motor home for some purposes"). 
236. Note, L.B. 155: Nebraska's "Lemon Law": Synthesizing Remedies for the Owner 
of a Lemon, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 345, 346 11.13 (1984) (quoting debate on floor of 
state legislature). In this article, one senator commented: 
We, as franchised dealers, could not be advocating any more strongly the 
consumer's position than in our presentation of this legislation. We 
value our customers' reputations and we resent being placed in the 
middleman position trying to attempt to help these- customers and 
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A primary impetus for the promulgation of lemon laws was a 
desire on the part of legislatures to simpllfj the automobile owner's 
cause of action for recovery of economic loss due to a defective 
au t~mobi le ,~~ '  and to permit owner recovery of direct economic 
loss, including recovery for damage the defective condition caused 
to the automobile itself.298 In the words of the Supreme Court of 
Vermont, a typical lemon law is passed "in order to facilitate an 
expeditious and inexpensive resolution of automobile warranty 
problems."2" Pennsylvania's lemon law, for example, provides that 
the "manufacturer of a new vehicle sold in the Commonwealth 
shall repair or correct, at no cost to the purchaser, a nonconformity 
which substantially impairs the use, value or safety of said motor 
vehicle which may occur within a period of one year following 
actual delivery of the vehicle to the purchaser, within the first 
12,000 miles of use or during the term of the warranty, whichever 
may first The lemon laws passed by many jurisdiction^^^' 
enjoy marked similarities, with a large number modeled on the 
Connecticut lemon 
243 Most lemon law apply only to new vehicles. Moreover, most 
ourselves resolve these problems. Everyone, the public, the dealers, the 
manufacturers, should appreciate having clearcut and not arbitra~y 
parameters in this matter within which we can still operate. 
Id. 
237. Hearings on House Bill 5729 Before Connecticut General Law Comm. 
235 (March 11, 1982) ("[The bill would] release the consumer from the legal 
burdens and difficulties that exist when one brings suit under our present law.") 
(comments of Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor). 
238. ALPERIN & CHASE, supra note 227, at p.325 n.1 (noting that 33 states plus 
the District of Columbia have lemon laws, and collecting law review commentary ); 
Note, Lemon Law: Putting the Squeeze on Automobib Manufacturers, 61 WASH. U .  L.Q. 
1125, 1149 n.125 (1984). 
239. In re Vilhueve, 709 A.2d 1067, 1068 (Vt. 1998) (referencing 9 VT. STAT. 
AYN. §§ 4170-81. 
240. 73 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1954, analyzed in Pavese v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
No. CIV. A. 97-3688,1998 WL 57761 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
241. CAL. CN. CODE § 1793.2 (1998); 6 DEL. CODE §§ 5001-5009; FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 681.10-681.108 (1990); 10 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1161-1165 (1999); MASS. 
GEN. LAwsANN. ch. 90, §§ 7N-7N 1/2 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. 3 325F.665 (2000); 
Mom. CODE ANN. §§ 614501 to 614505 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. 5s 60-2702 to 60- 
2709 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D (1995); 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-a; 1983 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 8, 176; TEX. CN. CODE 
ANN. art. 4413(36) (2000); 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. 2472; Wls. STAT. ANN. 5 218.015 
(1994); Wyo. STAT. Am. § 40-17-101 (1999). 
242. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-179 (2000). 
243. See generally Jarvis v. Safari Motor Coaches, Inc., 670 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1998) (interpreting New York's General Business Law § 198-a, the state's 
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lemon laws restrict their remedies to "consumers," which is to say, 
purchasers of vehicles for personal use.244 Some lemon laws apply 
only sales,245 while others cover lease agreements.'46   or whatever 
state-by-state distinctions may exist between lemon laws, several 
elements are common to practically all. The lemon laws: (1) state 
that their remedies are nonex~lusive;'~~ (2) extend the 
manufacturer's repair obligations beyond the temporal limitations 
in any express warranty when repair efforts during the warranty 
period have failed;248 (3) provide a purchaser remedy of refund or 
replacement upon failure of a reasonable number of attempts to 
repair, and speciEy the number of repair attempts that will be 
considered rea~onable;"~ (4) vest in the consumer a direct action 
against the manufa~turer;"~ and ( 5 )  require the consumer to resort 
first to a "qualified third-party dispute resolution process," or 
25 
arbitration. Many lemon laws have been interpreted to create a 
rebuttable presumption that four repair initiatives, or a designated 
number of days out of commission, represent a reasonable 
number of attempts to bring the vehicle into conformity with its 
warranty.'" 
"New Car Lemon Law."). E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-16A-2(C) (1995) (defining 
consumer as a buyer of "a new motor vehicle" for purposes other than resale), 
discussed in Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 953 P.2d 1104, 1107 (N.M. 1998). The 
Jones court references approvingly Joseph Goldberg, New Mexico's "Lemon Law": 
Consumer Protection or Consumer Frustration, 16 N.M. L. REV. 251,264 (1986) (" [TI he 
law largely, though not exclusively, is confined to the sale of new vehicles for 
personal (as opposed to business) use."). 
244. E.g., ALA. CODE § 820A-l(1) (1999) (discussed in Lipham v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 665 So. 2d 190, 193 (Ala. 1995)); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 57-16A-2(C) (1995) 
(defining consumer as "the purchaser, other than for purposes of resale, of a new 
motor vehicle for personal, family or household purposes, any person to whom 
such motor vehicle has been transferred during the duration of an express 
warranty applicable to the motor vehicle and any other person entitle by the terms 
of the warranty to enforce the terms of the warranty"). 
245. E.g., Pavese v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. CIV. A. 97-3688., 1998 WL 57761 
(E.D. Pa. 1998) (interpreting 73 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1954). 
246. E.g., TENN. COD. ANN. §§ 5524201, 55-24204 (1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
407.560. See other statutes collected at Pavese, 1998 WL 57761, at *3. 
247. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 1. 
248. Id. at § 1 (d). 
249. Id. at § 18 & subsection (d). 
250. Id. at § 2. 
251. E.g., CAL. CML CODE § 1793.2(e) (2) (1998); Ford Motor Co. v. Fowler, 
705 So. 2d 662 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1998) (appeal of determination of Florida Motor 
Vehicle Arbitration Board under auspices of that state's lemon law dispute 
settlement procedure process). 
252. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-179("out of service by reason of repair for a 
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A complainant must bring his claim, including any appeal of 
the decision of an arbitration board, in a timely fashion.*j3 
However, a manufacturer may waive any defense of untimeliness by 
its voluntary participation in the dispute settlement process.254 A 
lemon law may permit the prevailing complainant reasonable 
attorneys fees and The goal of such a statute "is to make 
the consumer whole, and to restore the consumer to a position he 
or she occupied before acquiring the lemon."z56 
cumulative total of thirty or more calendar days"). Compare with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
681.104(4) (2000) (fifteen working day and three repair attempt criteria); N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 198a(d) ( fourth attempt and thirty day limit within two years of 
purchase or 18,000 miles, whichever comes first). 
253. E.g., FLA.STAT.ANN. § 681.1095(10) (1990) (providing that appeal of 
decision of Florida Motor Vehicle Arbitration Board must be filed within "30 days 
after receipt of the decision"). A consumer "who pursues a case in front of the 
arbitration panel must file a damage action within one year after the final action 
of the [Bloard." Ford Motor Co. v. Fowler, 705 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1998). 
254. E.g., Fowler, 705 So. 2d at 663. 
255. Ledoux v. Ford Motor Co., No. 96-6981, 1998 WL 107112, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
1998) ("In determining appropriate attorney's fees, the court must first determine 
the lodestar. The lodestar is a computation of a reasonable hourly rate multiplied 
by the number of hours the court determines the attorney reasonably worked. 
The court may then adjust the lodestar as the court deems appropriate.") 
(citations omitted). E.g., Pugliese v. Chrysler Corp., 1998 WL 34857, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. 1998) (reasonable rates in jurisdiction ranging from $100 to $150 per hour); 
Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.75(A), discussed in Fortner v. Ford Motor Co., 1998 WL 
172862, at *1-*2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished opinion). 
256. Fortner, 1998 WL 172862, at *l.  
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